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AUGUST 2016 – AUGUST 2017: CASE LAW ON 
AMERICAN INDIANS 
 
By Thomas P. Schlosser 
 
I. UNITED STATE SUPREME COURT 
1. Lewis v. Clarke 
No. 15–1500, 2017 WL 1447161, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (U.S. Apr. 25, 
2017). Motor vehicle driver and passenger brought action against 
Indian tribe member in his individual capacity, alleging that 
member's negligence in driving tribe-owned limousine carrying 
patrons of tribe-owned casino caused off-reservation motor vehicle 
accident on interstate freeway. The Connecticut Superior Court, 
2014 WL 5354956, denied member's motion to dismiss based on 
tribal sovereign immunity. Member appealed. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court, 320 Conn. 706, 135 A.3d 677, reversed and 
remanded with directions. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court held that:  (1) tribe member was the real party in interest in 
the suit brought against him in his individual capacity, and thus, 
tribe member was not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, and 
(2) Indian tribe's indemnification statute for its employees did not 
make the tribe the real party in interest, as would support tribal 
sovereign immunity. Reversed and remanded. 
2. Patchak v. Zinke 
No. 16–498, Cert Granted 137 S. Ct. 2091, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2894 
(May 1, 2017). Case Below: Patchak v. Jewell, No. 15-5200, 828 
F.3d 995, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984 (D.D.C. July 15, 2016). 
Petition for writ of certiorari granted limited to Question 1 of the 
petition, “Does a statute directing the federal courts to ‘promptly 
dismiss’ a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by 
the court (including this Court’s determination that the suit ‘may 
proceed’) – without amending underlying substantive or procedural 
laws – violate the Constitution’s separation of powers principles?”  
David Patchak brought this suit under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, challenging the authority of the 
Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of land 
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under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465. The 
land, called the Bradley Property, had been put into trust for the use 
of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in 
Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake 
Tribe. Following the Supreme Court’s determination in 2012 that 
Mr. Patchak had prudential standing to bring this lawsuit, see 
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2212, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2012), Congress 
passed the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), a stand-alone statute reaffirming the 
Department of the Interior’s decision to take the land in question 
into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from 
the federal courts over any actions relating to that property. The 
District Court determined on summary judgment that it was stripped 
of its jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patchak’s claim. Holding 
additionally that the Act was not constitutionally infirm, the District 
Court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals held that:  
(1) Appellant landowner’s suit contesting appellee Department of 
the Interior’s taking of land in trust for appellee tribe failed because 
the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 
128 Stat. 1913 (2014), permissibly removed federal jurisdiction, as 
the Act constitutionally exercised Congress’s power to legislate as 
to Indian tribes; (2) The Act did not violate the landowner’s right to 
petition because Congress could withhold federal jurisdiction; 
(3) The Act did not violate his due process rights because the 
legislation provided all process that was due; (4) The Act was not a 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 bill of attainder because its means were 
rationally designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive goals.  
II. OTHER COURTS 
A. Administrative law 
3. Chissoe v. Jewell 
No. 15-CV-0166-CVE-TLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132239 (N.D. 
Okla. Sep. 27, 2016). This was an administrative appeal of agency 
action by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiff 
Darrell Chissoe (plaintiff) brought an appeal on behalf of his 
deceased father, Paul Chissoe (Chissoe), pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (APA). 
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Plaintiff argues that the agency decision was arbitrary and contrary 
to law because defendant failed to take restricted Indian land into 
trust as mandated by federal statute and Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) regulations. Defendant argued that the agency decision 
should be affirmed because the BIA cannot take land into trust for a 
deceased individual or an estate. Furthermore, plaintiff appeared to 
be putting forth not only new arguments, but also entirely new 
claims. The agency action at issue in the administrative appeal was 
the BIA’s termination of plaintiff’s fee-to-trust process on the basis 
of Chissoe’s death. In plaintiff’s opening brief, he asserted that he 
was “bring[ing] this proceeding pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act upon failure of Defendant to take restricted Indian 
land in trust.”  Plaintiff’s opening brief then made two arguments:  
that BIA’s failure to take the property into trust violates (1) a federal 
statute and (2) the agency’s own regulations. Terminating an 
application process and failing to take property into trust are two 
different agency actions. The first is an action appealable under the 
procedures contained in 25 C.F.R. § 2.7. The second is the failure of 
an official to act and is appealable under the procedures contained 
in 25 C.F.R. § 2.8. The claims plaintiff argues in the proceeding 
were not the claim addressed in the administrative proceeding. 
Therefore, the Court did not address the merits of plaintiff’s claims 
argued in the opening brief and reply brief because they have not 
been administratively exhausted. The court affirmed the decision of 
the United States Department of the Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals. 
4. Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell 
No. 2:16-01345 WBS CKD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147053 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 24, 2016). Plaintiffs Silvia Burley, Rashel Reznor, 
Anjelica Paulk, and Tristian Wallace brought this action against 
defendants Secretary of Interior Sally Jewell, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Interior Lawrence Roberts, and Director of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) Michael Black for declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and due process violations arising out an 
administrative decision on the membership and leadership of the 
California Valley Miwok Tribe (Tribe). Before the court was 
plaintiffs’ motion to stay enforcement of the Assistant Secretary’s 
December 30, 2015, decision (December 2015 Decision). This 
action is part of a long-running leadership dispute over the Tribe 
  
 
64 
between the Burley Faction – made up of Burley, Reznor, Paulk, 
and Wallace--and Yakima Dixie. See Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. 
United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.D.C. 2006) (hereinafter 
“Miwok I”); Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 
1262, 380 U.S. App. D.C. 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Miwok 
II”); Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell, 5 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 
2013) (hereinafter “Miwok III”). In 1916, the United States acquired 
a parcel of land for the Tribe’s benefit. In a 2005 hearing, the BIA 
refused to accept a constitution submitted by Burley that alleged that 
the Burley Faction were the only Tribe members because the 
constitution did not reflect the participation of the whole 
community. This decision was upheld by the district court in Miwok 
I and the D.C. Circuit in Miwok II. While Miwok II was pending, 
the BIA notified Dixie and Burley that it would move forward with 
facilitating the Tribe’s organization. In December 2010, the 
Assistant Secretary determined that the tribal government was 
organized under the 1998 Resolution and General Council. In 
August 2011, the Assistant Secretary issued a revised decision that 
reached the same conclusion. He found (1) the citizenship of the 
Tribe consisted solely of Dixie and the Burley Faction and (2) the 
1998 General Council was the Tribe’s government. Dixie 
challenged the August 2011 Decision. Based on the record, the 
Miwok III court held the August 2011 Decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. The court held that the Assistant Secretary ignored 
substantial evidence in the record and assumed conclusions without 
providing a factual basis. The court remanded the case to the 
Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary issued his December 
2015 Decision in response to the Miwok III remand. He held, based 
on the record and previous federal decisions, that the Tribe’s 
membership was not limited to five members and the 1998 General 
Council was not a tribal government. Finally, the Assistant 
Secretary found Dixie’s 2013 Constitution did not establish a tribal 
government, but he allowed Dixie to submit additional evidence to 
a Regional Director in order to determine whether the 2013 
Constitution was validly ratified. Plaintiffs challenged the 
December 2015 Decision and brought this suit against the federal 
defendants. Because plaintiffs have failed to meet the second and 
third prongs for a preliminary injunction, the court thus does not 
need to address the likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, 
the court must deny. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ 
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motion to stay the Assistant Secretary’s December 2015 Decision 
pending final resolution of this case, considered as a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.  
5. Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States 
 Nos. 15-1688, 15-1726, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20192 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 9, 2016). This case is the latest in a long line of lawsuits 
regarding the efforts of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (the 
Tribe) to assert tribal jurisdiction over a portion of its indigenous 
homeland in central New York State. After the Supreme Court 
rejected the Tribe’s claim to existing, historically-rooted jurisdiction 
over a portion of the homeland, see City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 161 L. Ed. 2d 386 (2005), 
the Tribe requested that the United States take approximately 17,000 
acres of Tribe-owned land into trust on its behalf in procedures 
prescribed by § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The 
entrustment that the federal government approved in 2008 gave the 
Tribe jurisdiction over approximately 13,000 acres of land in central 
New York, allowing the Tribe, among other things, to continue to 
operate its Turning Stone casino in Verona, New York. Plaintiffs-
Appellants, two towns, a civic organization, and several residents of 
the area near the trust land, filed these lawsuits in an attempt to 
reverse the land-into-trust decisions. They now appeal from 
judgments of the Northern District of New York, granting the 
summary judgment motions of Defendants-Appellants, the United 
States and several federal officials. The District Court rejected 
Plaintiffs’ claims that the land-into-trust procedures are 
unconstitutional and that certain provisions of the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act (ILCA), adopted in 1983, bar the United States 
from taking land into trust for the Tribe. We agree with the District 
Court that the entrustment procedure generally, and this entrustment 
in particular, lie within the federal government’s long-recognized 
“plenary” power over Indian tribes:  Neither principles of state 
sovereignty nor the Constitution’s Enclave Clause, which requires 
state consent for the broadest federal assertions of jurisdiction over 
land within a state, prevents the federal government from conferring 
on the Tribe jurisdiction over these trust lands. We further hold that 
the Oneida Nation of New York is eligible as a “tribe” within the 
meaning of 25 U.S.C. §§ 465 and 2201(1) for land to be taken into 
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trust on its behalf. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the 
District Court. 
6. Miranda v. Jewell 
No. 15-55245, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22514 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 
2016). Margaret Miranda and members of her family (collectively, 
the “Plaintiffs”) are the daughters, granddaughters, and great-
granddaughter of Rosa Pace, an enrolled member of the Santa Ynez 
Band of Chumash Mission Indians (the “Band”). Those Plaintiffs 
who are not already enrolled in the Band applied for enrollment, and 
those who are already enrolled applied to have their recorded degree 
of Santa Ynez blood increased. Under Santa Ynez law, for 
enrollment in the Band, a person is required to have one-quarter or 
more Santa Ynez blood. Whether the Plaintiffs who seek enrollment 
have the requisite one-quarter Santa Ynez blood (and whether the 
remaining Plaintiffs are entitled to blood-degree increases) depends 
on whether Rosa Pace, their common ancestor, was a full-blooded 
or half-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. The parties point to conflicting 
sources of evidence on this issue. A 1940 Census Roll of the Band’s 
members prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the “Bureau”) 
lists Pace as a full-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. On the other hand, a 
Membership Roll prepared by the Band in 1965 lists Pace’s blood 
degree as one-half. Relying on the 1965 Membership Roll, the Band 
denied the Plaintiffs’ applications, and the Plaintiffs appealed to the 
Bureau. The Bureau sustained the Band’s decision to reject the 
Plaintiffs’ applications. The Plaintiffs then filed this suit against 
Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell and the Department of the 
Interior challenging the Bureau’s action on the Plaintiffs’ appeal 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596. The 
district court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the Bureau’s action was not “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”  The Plaintiffs timely appealed. Regulations appearing in 
Part 62 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations provide that 
the Bureau “shall” hear an appeal from an Indian tribe’s denial of an 
enrollment application where the tribe’s “governing document” so 
provides. In disposing of such an appeal, the Bureau does not abuse 
its discretion where it defers to an Indian tribe’s “reasonable 
interpretation of [its] own laws.”  The reasonableness of a tribe’s 
interpretation of its law is evaluated “based on the language of the 
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[tribe’s] governing documents and the past practice of the [tribe].”  
Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, Article 
III of the Band’s Articles of Organization provides that a person is 
eligible for enrollment in the Band if she is the living descendant of 
a person whose name appears on the Band’s January 1, 1940 Census 
Roll and if she has one-fourth or more degree of Indian blood of the 
Band. Ordinance 2, passed by the Band’s General Council in 1965, 
defines “Indian blood of the Band” to mean “the total percentage of 
Indian blood derived from an ancestor  . . . who [was] listed on the 
1940 Census Roll.”  Ordinance 2 also permits an applicant to appeal 
an adverse enrollment decision to the Bureau. The Plaintiffs argue 
that Article III requires the Band to look only to the 1940 Census 
Roll, and no other documents, to determine an applicant’s degree of 
Santa Ynez blood. Under Ordinance 2, however, the Band may 
consider “tribal records, information presented in the application or 
other sources of information” when evaluating an enrollment 
application. Thus, the Band has interpreted Article III as not 
forbidding the Band to review documents other than the 1940 
Census Roll in determining an applicant’s degree of Indian blood of 
the Band. This interpretation is reasonable given the language of the 
Band’s governing documents and the past practice of the Band. 
Article III does not define the term “Indian blood of the Band,” and 
although it refers to no documents other than the 1940 Census Roll, 
it neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits the Band from 
considering such other documents when evaluating an enrollment 
application. Because the Band’s interpretation of Article III is 
“reasonable,” the Bureau did not abuse its discretion by deferring to 
it and sustaining the Band’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ applications. 
Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
Defendants is affirmed.  
7. Mishewal Wappo Tribe Of Alexander Valley v. Ryan Zinke; 
Michael Black 
No. 15-15993, 2017 WL 1433323, 688 Fed. Appx. 480 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 24, 2017). The Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley 
(the Tribe) sued the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of Interior (the Federal Defendants), asserting claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty and violations under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. The district court granted the Federal Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. (1) The district court correctly 
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concluded that all of the Tribe's claims relied upon a central 
allegation that the Federal Defendants unlawfully terminated the 
Alexander Valley Rancheria. We decline to address the Tribe's new 
argument that termination of the Rancheria did not terminate its 
status as a federally recognized tribe because the Tribe did not raise 
this argument before the district court. See Robinson v. Jewell, 790 
F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2015). (2) The Tribe argues that the United 
States owes a continuing fiduciary duty to the Tribe, and that the 
existence of this duty precludes the running of the statute of 
limitations. We do not decide whether the Federal Defendants owe 
a fiduciary duty to the Tribe. If there is such a duty in this case, the 
existence of such a duty does not at all prevent the statute of 
limitations from running under the circumstances presented here. 
(3) The Tribe did not diligently pursue its rights or show that 
extraordinary circumstances prevented it from doing so. Equitable 
tolling is therefore not appropriate. The Tribe argues that the Federal 
Defendants induced it to not file an action or proceed through the 
administrative recognition process by representing in various ways 
that the Federal Defendants would restore the Tribe’s Status as a 
federally recognized Tribe. The earliest piece of evidence the Tribe 
cites to support this claim is a 1987 letter from the Area Director of 
the Sacramento Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
recommends that the BIA adopt a policy to extend federal 
recognition to various rancherias, including “Alexander Valley.”  
Even assuming this letter induced the Tribe to refrain from pursuing 
other avenues of recognition or litigation to rectify the purportedly 
unlawful termination of the Rancheria, it was issued about twenty-
six years after the Rancheria was terminated. The 1987 letter could 
not warrant tolling of the statute of limitations for the twenty years 
beforehand. The Tribe did not meet its burden to support equitable 
tolling. AFFIRMED.  
8. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke 
No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72364 (W.D. Wash. 
May 11, 2017). This matter was before the Court on Plaintiff the 
Nooksack Indian Tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction and 
Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss. Plaintiff the Nooksack Indian 
Tribe brought this action against Defendants, collectively the 
leadership of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA). Since 2007, Plaintiff has been a party to 638 
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contracts with the DOI and BIA, entered into pursuant to the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Plaintiff alleges 
“under the terms of these contracts, the defendants fund the Tribe to 
provide programs, functions, services, or activities of the [DOI] for 
the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.”  Plaintiff 
brings this action partially “to compel the defendants to fully fund 
contracts awarded to the Tribe under the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act.”  However, the purported 
disenrollment of hundreds of Nooksack tribe members in late 2016 
and the recent tribal government changes, all completed when the 
Nooksack Indian Tribal Council lacked a quorum, are fundamental 
underlying facts in this action. On June 21, 2013, Nooksack Indian 
voters approved a membership requirement change to the Nooksack 
Constitution proposed by the Council. The change was challenged 
in the Nooksack tribal courts and upheld. However, the membership 
criteria change is currently before the DOI’s Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals for approval. In March 2016, the Nooksack Indian Tribal 
Council scheduled a general election to fill three council seats whose 
terms were set to expire on March 24, 2016. However, “the Tribe 
delayed the election, and the three Council members retained their 
seats as holdovers pending the election of their replacements.” 
Regardless of the reason for cancelling the 2016 election, as of 
March 24, 2016, only three of eight Council members occupy seats 
whose terms have not expired. Therefore, Defendants allege the 
Council has been acting without a quorum since March 24, 2016. 
The Court will refer to the Council group, as composed after 
March 24, 2016, as the holdover Council for clarity. On January 21, 
2017, Plaintiff and the holdover Council allegedly conducted a 
general election to fill the three seats held by the holdover Council 
members whose terms had expired. There were no challenges to the 
election results. The results were “certified by the duly-appointed 
Election Superintended [sic], consistent with Nooksack law.”  
Defendants maintain their disapproval of the holdover Council, 
calling its conduct “abusive,” and alleging the Council has “used its 
de facto control to systematically abridge the rights of a disfavored 
group of tribal members, thereby depriving them of their right to 
fully participate in and receive benefits under federal programs.”  
The holdover Council, on behalf of the Nooksack Indian Tribe, now 
moves the Court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining 
Defendants from “(1) taking further steps to reassume 
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responsibilities the Tribe performs for its enrolled members under 
its Public Law 638 contracts; (2) taking further actions based on 
three opinion letters written by [PDAS Roberts]; and (3) continuing 
to interfere with the Tribe’s self-governance by refusing to 
acknowledge that the current, duly-elected members of the 
Nooksack Tribal Council are the Tribe’s governing body.”  
Defendants opposed the motion, and filed a cross-motion to dismiss, 
or in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing that the Court 
lacks jurisdiction over this case. (Dkt. No. 26.) Because Defendants 
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter, the Court will 
consider the motion to dismiss first. These are very rare 
circumstances. The DOI found that the Nooksack Indian Tribal 
Council, currently existing as the holdover Council, lacks authority 
due to a lack of quorum. The DOI decisions stand during the interim 
until the DOI and BIA recognize a newly elected Nooksack Indian 
Tribal Council. This Court’s lack of jurisdiction is not permanent or 
inflexible. If the DOI and BIA recognize Nooksack tribal leadership 
after new elections and the nation-to-nation relationship is resumed, 
the new tribal leadership would have authority to initiate an action 
against the federal government. However, under this set of facts and 
with a clear lack of recognition from the DOI and BIA, the Court 
must decline jurisdiction. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction IS GRANTED. The holdover Council’s 
claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
9. Cherokee Nation v. Jewell 
No. CIV-14-428-RAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82896 (E.D. Okla. 
May 31, 2017). On May 24, 2011, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), Eastern Oklahoma Region (Region) for the United States 
Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a Decision (2011 Decision) 
approving an amended application of the United Keetoowah Band 
of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma (UKB) to take a seventy-six acre 
tract located in Cherokee County (Subject Tract) into trust for the 
use and benefit of the UKB Corporation. The UKB owns the Subject 
Tract in fee. The Subject Tract is also located within the former 
reservation of the Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee Nation filed this 
action challenging the 2011 Decision, pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (APA) and 25 
U.S.C. § 465. The Cherokee Nation argues that the 2011 Decision 
is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not 
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in accordance with law because, inter alia, there is no statutory or 
regulatory authority to take land into trust for the UKB Corporation, 
the Cherokee Nation’s consent is required to take the Subject Tract 
into trust, the 2011 Decision violates its treaties, and ignores the 
administrative burdens that would be created by the trust 
acquisition. The Cherokee Nation urges this court to set aside the 
2011 Decision and to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) 
from accepting the Subject Tract into trust. The 2011 Decision was 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not 
in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court finds in favor of the 
Cherokee Nation and remands this action to the Region. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the court’s findings herein, the 
Secretary is enjoined from taking the Subject Tract into trust without 
the Cherokee Nation’s written consent and full consideration of the 
jurisdictional conflicts and the resulting administrative burdens the 
acquisition would place on the Region. Before taking any land into 
trust for the UKB or the UKB Corporation, the Region shall consider 
the effect of Carcieri on such acquisition.  
10. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, et al. 
No. 16–1534 (JEB), 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 2017 WL 2573994 
(D.D.C. Jun. 14, 2017). Indian tribes brought action under 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against Army Corps of 
Engineers alleging, inter alia, that Corps’ authorization of crude oil 
pipeline under federally regulated waterway bordering tribes’ 
reservations violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), and Mineral Leasing Act (MLA). 
Indian tribes moved for partial summary judgment and Corps cross-
moved for partial summary judgment. The District Court held that:  
(1) Corps took requisite “hard look” at risk of oil spill in its 
environmental assessment (EA) of pipeline; (2) Corps failed to take 
requisite “hard look” at methodological and data flaws in its 
assessment of oil spill risk identified in expert reports submitted to 
Corps; (3) Corps took requisite “hard look” at potential impact of 
construction of pipeline on tribe’s water, fishing, and hunting treaty 
rights in its EA; (4) Corps failed to take requisite “hard look” at 
potential impact of oil spill on tribe’s fishing and hunting treaty 
rights in its EA; (5) Corps adequately considered alternatives to 
proposed location of pipeline in its EA; (6) Corps’ use of 0.5-mile 
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buffer in environmental-justice analysis under NEPA was arbitrary 
and capricious; (7) grant of easement under MLA did not violate 
Corps’ trust responsibility to protect tribe’s treaty rights; (8) Corps’ 
conclusion that pipeline would not impair waterway, as required for 
issuance of RHA permit, was not arbitrary and capricious; and 
(9) Corps imposed sufficient liability on pipeline operator, as 
required for easement under MLA. Ordered accordingly. 
B. Child Welfare Law and Indian Child  
Welfare Act (ICWA) 
11. Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians 
No. 2:16-cv-1685-MCE-AC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119394 (E.D. 
Cal. Sep. 2, 2016). Plaintiffs Efrim and Talisha Renteria 
(“Plaintiffs”) brought an action against the Shingle Springs Band of 
Miwok Indians (“Tribe”), its Tribal Council, its Tribal Court, 
Christine Williams in her official capacity as the Tribal Court judge, 
Regina Cuellar in both her official capacity as a member of the 
Tribal Council and her individual capacity as the appointed guardian 
of Plaintiffs’ three minor nieces (“Minors”), all of whom are under 
seven years old. They seek to prevent the enforcement of Tribal 
Court’s June 3, 2016 Order (June 3 Order) appointing Defendant 
Regina Cuellar as the legal guardian of the Minors. Their Complaint 
attacked the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over the custody 
proceedings, and further alleged that the June 3 Order is 
unenforceable in courts subject to the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution because the underlying proceedings 
violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Plaintiffs are the maternal 
great aunt and uncle of the Minors. The Minors’ parents were killed 
in a car accident on December 17, 2015. Their late father was a 
member of the Tribe, but the Minors resided and were domiciled 
with their parents in Visalia, California. They have never resided or 
been domiciled on tribal lands. Plaintiffs cared for the Minors in the 
weeks following the accident. On January 5, 2016, members of the 
children’s paternal family appeared at Plaintiffs’ house in Visalia, 
presented a copy of an emergency order issued by the Tribal Court 
of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (Tribal Court) to 
Plaintiffs and forcibly removed the two youngest Minors (the eldest 
Minor remained hospitalized from injuries sustained in the car 
accident that killed her parents). On January 22, 2016, the Tribal 
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Court held a review hearing regarding guardianship, appointed 
Plaintiffs as temporary guardians for the Minors, and established a 
schedule of visitations for the paternal family. Beginning in 
February 2016, the two older children repeatedly reported that their 
paternal step-grandfather (Joseph) sexually abused them during 
their visits. Plaintiffs reported the abuse to the Visalia Police 
Department and the Tulare County Health & Human Services 
Agency. In the days that followed Plaintiffs’ initial police report, the 
children were interviewed outside of Plaintiffs’ presence on three 
separate occasions by social workers with no connection to the 
family. The two older children continued to report instances of 
sexual abuse by Joseph to these social workers. After Plaintiffs 
made these reports, the Tribal Court modified the visitation order 
such that Joseph was not to have access to the Minors. On June 3, 
2016, the Tribal Court appointed Defendant Regina Cuellar as the 
Minors’ permanent guardian over Plaintiffs’ competing petition and 
objections. Defendant Cuellar’s appointment became effective June 
12, 2016. At the same time, the Tribal Court issued a visitation order 
that failed to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors. The Minors then 
went for visitation with Defendant Regina Cuellar on June 4 and 5. 
The failure to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors during this visit 
resulted in yet another instance of alleged sexual abuse. Plaintiffs 
declined to give custody of the Minors to the paternal family on June 
12 and caused a Good Cause Report to be filed with the Tulare 
County District Attorney. Plaintiffs then filed this action on July 21, 
2016. They seek a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked 
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for the Minors in the first instance, 
a declaration that the proceedings that led to the appointment of 
Regina Cuellar violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights, and an 
injunction preventing the enforcement of the June 3 Order outside 
of tribal lands. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 
(TRO) enjoining enforcement of the Tribal Court’s June 3 Order 
pending a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
As a result of that order, plaintiffs requested a supplemental TRO 
enjoining the enforcement of any additional Tribal Court orders in 
the custody proceeding pending the resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion. 
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ application for a supplemental TRO for 
failure to comply with Local Rule 231. Defendants oppose 
Plaintiffs’ Motion. They contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction 
over the Tribal Defendants, and that Plaintiffs’ action cannot 
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proceed solely against Defendant Cuellar in her individual capacity 
under Rule 19(b). Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument, while 
not entirely convincing, raises serious questions about the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the Tribal Defendants. The Court, however, can 
provide Plaintiffs with the relief they seek by dismissing the Tribal 
Defendants and allowing this action to go forward against Regina 
Cuellar in her individual capacity. The Court dismisses the Tribal 
Defendants, finds that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 does not 
mandate joinder, and proceeds to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
solely with respect to Defendant Cuellar. As to their due process 
claim, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary 
injunctive relief and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion with respect to 
Defendant Cuellar in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs’ action may 
proceed against Defendant Regina Cuellar in her individual 
capacity, and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED 
as to Defendant Regina Cuellar in her individual capacity. 
Defendant Cuellar is hereby ENJOINED from attempting to seek 
recognition or enforcement of the Tribal Court’s June 3 Order 
appointing her as permanent guardian of the Minors outside of the 
Tribal Court pending a final disposition of this action on the merits.  
12. State v. Reich-Crabtree (In re M.H.C.) 
No. 114552, 2016 Okla. LEXIS 91, 2016 OK 88 (OK, Sep. 13, 
2016). Cherokee Nation filed a motion to transfer the deprived case 
of M.H.C. to tribal court upon natural mother’s tribal enrollment. 
State of Oklahoma and foster mother objected. The district court 
granted the motion to transfer, finding State and foster mother failed 
to present clear-and-convincing evidence to overcome the 
presumption in favor of tribal court jurisdiction in cases concerning 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 
(1978). Section 1911(b) of the ICWA controls a motion to transfer 
a child-custody proceeding from state court to tribal court where the 
child is an Indian child under the statutory definition. The questions 
presented to this Court are whether the district court erred when it 
(1) found ICWA applicable to a case where the child was not an 
Indian child when the case was filed and (2) found lack of good 
cause to keep the case in state court. As an aside, before this Court 
is also the question whether a finding of ICWA’s applicability must 
be applied retroactively to all prior proceedings in the case. M.H.C. 
(the child) was born in September of 2013. The Oklahoma 
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Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child in protective 
custody on November 5, 2013. In the initial petition filed on 
November 18, 2013, the State of Oklahoma declared ICWA’s 
provisions applicable. On November 21, 2013, the Cherokee Nation 
appeared at the initial appearance, and the natural mother informed 
the court that she had a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood but 
was not currently a tribal member. The natural mother was informed 
if she gained membership in the Cherokee Nation, ICWA would 
apply. The natural mother was also told if ICWA applied, the child 
would likely have to leave foster mother’s care because foster 
mother was a non-ICWA compliant placement. No party informed 
the natural mother of ICWA’s benefits and protections. The natural 
mother declined to enroll at the time. The appellate court found that 
the district court did not err in granting the motion to transfer the 
proceedings to the Cherokee Nation tribal court. The district court 
did not err in finding ICWA applicable upon the natural mother’s 
enrollment in the Cherokee Nation. ICWA applies to the 
proceedings prospectively from the date the record supports its 
application. Appellants have failed to present clear-and-convincing 
evidence of “good cause” for the case to remain in the Rogers 
County District Court. Because the district court did not err in 
granting the motion to transfer to Tribal Court, we affirm the order 
granting the motion to transfer.  
13. In re O.C. 
No. A147577, 2016 WL 6879279 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016). 
County children and family services agency filed petition against 
mother and father to terminate their parental rights to minor 
children, who potentially had Indian heritage. Following hearing, 
the Superior Court found both children adoptable, that exception to 
adoption for sibling bond did not apply, and that Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply and terminated parental rights. 
Mother and father appealed. The appellate court held that trial court 
failed to comply with notice requirements of ICWA and state law. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
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14. Daniel H. and Linda H. v. Tyler R. 
(In re Adoption of Micah H.) 
 
No. S-15-1080, 2016 Neb. LEXIS 169, 295 Neb. 213 (Neb. Dec. 2, 
2016). This case presents the issue of whether the “active efforts” 
and “serious emotional or physical damage” elements of the federal 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (lCWA) and the Nebraska Indian 
Child Welfare Act (NICWA) apply to provide increased protection 
to the parental rights of a non-Indian, noncustodial parent of an 
“Indian child.”  Daniel H. and Linda H., the maternal grandparents 
and guardians of Micah H., a minor child, appeal the order of the 
Saunders County Court denying their petition to adopt Micah. In 
their petition, Daniel and Linda alleged, among other things, that the 
child’s mother (their daughter), Allison H., had consented to the 
adoption; that the father, Tyler R., had abandoned Micah; and that 
terminating Allison’s and Tyler’s parental rights was in Micah’s 
best interests. In Tyler’s answer, he alleged that Micah was an 
“Indian Child” pursuant to ICWA and NICWA. Because neither 
party disputed that Micah met the “Indian child” definition under 
both acts, the county court applied those acts, which provide 
heightened protection to the rights of parents and tribes in 
proceedings involving custody, termination of parental rights, and 
adoption of Indian children. After a hearing on Daniel and Linda’s 
petition, the county court found that it was compelled to deny the 
petition, because it was ‘‘unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [Tyler] has abandoned the child.”  The appellate court found 
that the county court erred in applying the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard to the abandonment element and also in finding that 
Daniel and Linda were not required to show active efforts had been 
made to unite Tyler and Micah. We therefore reverse, and remand 
with directions to allow the parties to submit additional evidence in 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and 
remanded.  
 
15. Oglala Sioux Tribe & Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Fleming 
No. CIV. 13-5020-JLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173571 (D.S.D. 
Dec. 15, 2016). The defendants continue to disregard this court’s 
March 30, 2015, partial summary judgment order. That order 
outlined the defendants’ violations of the rights of Indian children, 
parents, custodians and tribes guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
  
 
77 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA). Notwithstanding testimony confirming that South Dakota 
Circuit Court Judges in Meade County, Brown County, Hughes 
County and Minnehaha County are conducting adversarial hearings 
in accord with the March 2015 order prior to the extended removal 
of Indian children from their homes, defendants refuse to reform 
their violative policies and practices. The court repeatedly invited 
the defendants to propose a plan for compliance with their 
constitutional and statutory obligations, but the defendants rejected 
that opportunity. This order discusses the need and the authority for 
this court to impose remedies to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights. Orders 
for declaratory and injunctive relief are filed simultaneously with 
this order. On March 21,2013, plaintiffs filed this civil rights action 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting defendants’ policies, 
practices and procedures relating to the removal of Indian children 
from their homes during state court 48-hour hearings violate the 
ICWA and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendants denied plaintiffs’ claims. On July 11, 2014, plaintiffs 
filed two separate motions identified as the “Section 1922 Claims” 
and the “Due Process Claims.”  Following extensive submissions by 
the parties, on March 30, 2015, the court entered an order granting 
plaintiffs’ motions (2015 order). By the 2015 order, the court 
reserved ruling on plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. On August 17. 2016, a hearing was held to address plaintiffs’ 
prayer for relief (remedies hearing). For the reasons stated below, 
plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is granted, plaintiffs’ 
request for injunctive relief is granted in part and plaintiffs’ request 
for appointment of a monitor is denied without prejudice as 
premature. Plaintiffs Oglala Sioux Tribe and Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
are Indian tribes officially recognized by the United States with 
reservations located within the State of South Dakota. The class of 
plaintiffs includes “all other members of federally recognized Indian 
tribes who reside in Pennington County, South Dakota, and who, 
like plaintiffs, are parents or custodians of Indian children.”  
Defendant Lynne A. Valenti is the Secretary of the South Dakota 
Department of Social Services (DSS). Since January 2010, 
approximately one hundred 48-hour hearings involving Indian 
children are held each year in Pennington County. In March 2015, 
the court found that despite “the clear intent of ICWA, the 
[Department of the Interior] Guidelines and the SD Guidelines, all 
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of which contemplate evidence will be presented on the record in 
open court, Judge Davis relied on the ICWA affidavit and petition 
for temporary custody which routinely are disclosed only to him and 
not to the Indian parents, their attorney or custodians.”  These 
undisclosed documents are not subject to cross-examination or 
challenge by the presentation of contradictory evidence. The 
practice of the state court was to “authorize DSS to perform the 
function of determining if, or when, the imminent risk of physical 
harm to an Indian child has passed and to restore custody to the 
child’s parents. . . . This authorization vests full discretion in DSS 
to make the decision if and when an Indian child may be reunited 
with the parents. The court found this abdication of judicial 
authority violated the protections guaranteed Indian parents, 
children and tribes under ICWA. In the March 2015 order, the court 
found the defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment during the course of 48-hour hearings. The 
violations are summarized as follows: (1) failing to appoint counsel 
in advance of the 48-hour hearing; (2) failing to provide notice of 
the claims against Indian parents, the issues to be resolved and the 
state’s burden of proof; (3) denial of the right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses; (4) denying Indian parents or custodians the right 
to present evidence in their own defense; and (5) removing Indian 
children on grounds not based on evidence presented in the hearing. 
The Court ordered that plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief is granted.  
16. A.D. by Carter v. Washburn 
No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Az. Mar. 16, 
2017). Before the Court are motions to dismiss. In this action the 
adult Plaintiffs and those who have undertaken to speak for the child 
Plaintiffs attempt to challenge parts of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) as unconstitutional racial discrimination. They also 
challenge Congress’s power to enact laws regulating state court 
proceedings and ousting state laws concerning foster care 
placement, termination of parental rights, pre-adoptive placement, 
and adoptive placements of some off-reservation children of Indian 
descent. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that certain provisions of the 
ICWA and of the Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian 
Child Custody Proceedings published on February 25, 2015 (2015 
Guidelines) by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian 
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Affairs (BIA), violate the United States Constitution, federal civil 
rights statutes, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by requiring State 
courts to treat Indian children differently than non-Indian children 
in child custody proceedings. Plaintiffs wish to adjudicate here in 
advance of injury to themselves. They do not have standing to have 
this Court pre-adjudicate for state court judges how to rule on facts 
that may arise and that may be governed by statutes or guidelines 
that this Court may think invalid. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
that the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended 
Complaint, the State Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First 
Amended Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and 
Other Relief, the Gila River Indian Community’s Motion to 
Dismiss, and the Navajo Nation’s Amended Motion to Dismiss are 
granted.  
17. Jude M. v. State 
No. S-16233, 2017 WL 1533373, 394 P.3d 543 (Alaska Apr. 28, 
2017). Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed petition to 
terminate father’s parental rights to Native American child 
adjudicated as child in need of aid. The superior court declined to 
terminate parental rights, but instead established long-term 
guardianship over child placed with foster family out-of-state. 
Father appealed. The supreme court held that:  (1) superior court had 
statutory authority to establish long-term guardianship over child 
after it declined to terminate father’s parental rights; (2) regulation 
prohibiting agency from placing child in guardianship without 
evidence that parental rights have been terminated or suspended did 
not apply; (3) long-term guardianship was not de facto termination 
of father’s parental rights that failed to comply with Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA); (4) active efforts were made to provide 
remedial and rehabilitative services designed to prevent breakup of 
family, as prerequisite to foster care placement/guardianship under 
ICWA; (5) determination that father, who was convicted sex 
offender, posed significant risk of re-offending and that risk 
encompassed child, was not supported by expert testimony; 
(6) evidence supported finding that father was unable to meet child’s 
caregiving needs, and thus, that father’s continued custody of child 
was likely to result in serious emotional or physical harm; 
(7) evidence supported finding that long-term guardianship under 
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current foster family placement was in child’s best interest. Vacated; 
remanded.  
18. The People of the State of South Dakota in the Interest of 
A.O., V.O. and C.O., Children and Concerning V.S.O., 
Respondent, C.G, Indian Custodian and OGLALA SIOUX 
TRIBE, Intervener 
Nos. 27864 and 27999, 896 N.W. 2d 652, 2017 S.D. 30, 2017 WL 
2290151 (S.D. May 24, 2017). Law enforcement removed A.O., 
V.O., and C.O. (the Children) from the home of their mother, V.S.O. 
(Mother), after discovering methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia in the home. Mother is an enrolled member of the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe (the Tribe). The same day, the State asked the 
circuit court to award temporary custody of the Children to the South 
Dakota Department of Social Services (the Department). The court 
granted the request. The Tribe was given timely notice and 
intervened. More than one year after the State initiated abuse-and-
neglect proceedings against Mother the circuit court denied motions 
to transfer the case to the jurisdiction of the Tribe. Mother appeals 
the termination of her parental rights, raising one issue:  Whether 
she was entitled to a hearing on the question whether good cause 
existed to deny the motions to transfer jurisdiction to the Tribe. 
Mother argued that the circuit court erred by denying the motions 
without holding an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court found 
that the circuit court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
on the question whether good cause existed to deny Mother’s and 
the Tribe’s motions to transfer the proceedings to the Tribe’s 
jurisdiction. The court was also required to make specific factual 
findings on this issue. The court failed to do so. Therefore, the court 
abused its discretion in denying the motions. The appellate court 
reversed the circuit court’s final dispositional order and remanded 
with instructions for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
question whether good cause exists to deny the motions to transfer. 
19. Doe v. Piper 
No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS), 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 124308 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 4, 2017). Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe (the Does) brought this 
action seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the portions of 
the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), Minn. Stat.  
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§§ 260.751-260.835, that require notice to Indian tribes for any 
voluntary adoption involving an “Indian child” and provide relevant 
Indian tribes a right of intervention are unconstitutional. The 
remaining defendants in this case are the Commissioner of the 
Minnesota Department of Human Resources, Emily Johnson Piper, 
and the Minnesota Attorney General, Lori Swanson (collectively, 
Defendants). The Does challenge two particular MIFPA provisions. 
First, the Does challenge the “notice” provision, under which “a 
local social services agency, private child-placing agency, petitioner 
in the adoption, or any other party” must notify the applicable “tribal 
social services agency” if the agency or person “has reason to 
believe that a child who is the subject of an adoptive or pre-adoptive 
placement proceeding is or may be an ‘Indian child’” under the 
statute. Minn. Stat. § 260.761. Second, the Does challenge the 
“intervention” provision, which provides an Indian child’s tribe the 
right to intervene at any point in adoption proceedings involving the 
child. In April 2015, Baby Doe was born to the Does in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. The Does are an unmarried couple, together since 2003, 
who live together with their children. The Does are both enrolled 
members of Indian tribes, Jane Doe in the Mille Lacs Band of 
Ojibwe, but neither domiciles within or resides on an Indian 
reservation. No court terminated the Does’ parental rights. Instead, 
the Does decided to voluntarily place Baby Doe for adoption and 
relinquish their parental rights. To facilitate Baby Doe’s adoption, 
the Does engaged a private direct placement agency that would 
allow the Does to choose Baby Doe’s adoptive parents. Neither of 
the chosen adoptive parents is of American Indian descent. The 
Does and the adoptive parents arranged an open adoption. The Does 
did not want to comply with the notice requirement because they did 
not want any tribe to learn of their adoption or risk a tribe’s 
intervention, which could lead to deviation from the adoption plan 
that they determined was best for their child. The Court found no 
threat of irreparable harm because the state court could protect the 
Does’ identities and the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe had already 
agreed not to intervene. Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, 
records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:  
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
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20. In re DETMER/BEAUDRY, Minors 
No. 336348, __ N.W. 2d __, 2017 WL 3614234 (Mich. App. Aug. 
22, 2017). We consider here whether the special protections 
provided to Native American parents and children under state law 
apply when a child is taken from her mother’s care and residence 
and placed in her father’s care and residence. Respondent-mother 
and her children, AB and KD, are eligible for the protections 
afforded to Native American families under Michigan Indian Family 
Preservation Act (MIFPA). The trial court removed AB from the 
care and residence of respondent-mother, and this removal triggered 
the statutory protections set forth in MCL 712B.15(2). Concluding 
that one of respondent-mother’s children (AB) was “removed,” we 
hold that the special protections set forth in the MIFPA do apply to 
AB’s removal. Because the trial court failed to comply with those 
protections, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. With 
respect to the other child at issue in this appeal (KD), we hold that 
the special protections do not apply because KD was not removed 
from respondent-mother, but instead voluntarily placed by 
respondent-mother with KD’s father. The trial court erred by not 
affording respondent-mother and AB these protections and, 
accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order of adjudication with 
respect to AB and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
C. Contracting 
21. N. Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte 
No. CV-16-11-BLG-BMM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143389 (D. 
Mont. Oct. 17, 2016). Plaintiffs Northern Arapaho Tribe (“NAT”) 
allege that Defendants violated their right to self-govern when 
Defendants converted NAT’s funds and federal funds and programs 
established by Congress for the benefit of NAT. Federal Defendants 
hold positions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). NAT 
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief along with the establishment 
of a constructive trust that would serve as a vehicle to recover 
allegedly converted funds. NAT also filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction. Federal Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the 
action on the grounds that:  (1) the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, (2) NAT has failed to state a claim on which relief can 
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be granted, and (3) NAT has failed to join an indispensable party. 
The Shoshone Tribe and the United States entered into a Treaty on 
July 2, 1868. 15 State. 673. The treaty established the Wind River 
Reservation “for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of 
the Shoshonee Indians.”  15 State. 673. The Eastern Shoshonee 
Tribe (“EST”) settled in the Wind River Reservation. The United 
States placed NAT on the Wind River Reservation in 1878. The 
tribes share the Wind River Reservation. Each tribe governs itself 
by vote of its tribal membership at general council meetings or by 
vote of its elected business council. No member of one tribe may 
hold office or legislate for the other tribe. The tribes have not entered 
into a joint constitution to consolidate their respective governments. 
The federal government created the Joint Business Council (“JBC”) 
following the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The federal 
government apparently considered it easier to interact with the two 
tribes’ business councils in joint form. The JBC originally contained 
the requirement that a quorum comprise four members from each 
tribe. NAT formally withdrew its participation from the JBC in 
September 2014. The Complaint alleges that the former SBC 
Defendants continue to operate the JBC and hold themselves out to 
third parties as having authority to act for both tribes. EST allegedly 
changed the quorum for the JBC to require only four members from 
EST rather than the original requirement of four members from each 
tribe. SBC Defendants allegedly have used the JBC to move shared 
property, to transfer federal and tribal funds from a joint account to 
accounts solely controlled by the SBC, and to make important 
employment and personnel decisions that affect both tribes. NAT 
further alleges that SBC Defendants misappropriated joint 638 self-
determination contracts. Specifically, NAT alleges that Federal 
Defendants have entered into 638 self-determination contracts with 
the JBC without the necessary approval from NAT. NAT alleges 
that Federal Defendants wrongfully have awarded 638 self-
determination contracts to the JBC despite knowing that NAT had 
withdrawn from the JBC. Norma Gourneau, BIA Superintendent for 
the Wind River Agency, sent a letter to both tribes’ business 
councils on August 3, 2016. (“Gourneau Letter”). Gourneau 
acknowledged that the BIA had approved self-determination 
contracts with SBC-as-JBC “on a temporary basis.”  Gourneau also 
stated that the BIA no longer would accept contract proposals for 
shared programs from either tribe without supporting resolutions 
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from both tribes. Gourneau cited to 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l) for support. 
Title 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l) prohibits the BIA from “letting or making” 
a self-determination contract “to perform services benefitting more 
than one Indian tribe” without “the approval of each such Indian 
tribe.”  NAT requests that the Court enjoin Federal Defendants from 
(1) representing that SBC possesses authority to take actions on 
behalf of NAT; and (2) approving unilateral action by SBC that 
affects NAT’s property, assets, program decisions, personnel 
directive, budget approvals, or policy changes. The Court:  
(1) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; (2) granted Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction requiring that in accordance with 
the Gourneau Letter, Defendants shall refrain from approving 638 
contracts for multi-tribal, shared services without the approval, via 
tribal government resolution, of both the Northern Arapaho Tribe 
and the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.  
22. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co. 
 No. C15-543RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5497 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 13, 2017). This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s 
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant BNSF 
Railway Company’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff filed this suit in April 2015 alleging that defendant 
breached a Right-of-Way Easement Agreement (Easement 
Agreement), asserting claims of breach of contract and trespass, and 
seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. 
Defendant raised preemption as an affirmative defense, arguing that 
plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. § 10501 et seq. 
Plaintiff filed a motion for a summary determination of the 
preemption defense. Defendant cross-moved on the preemption 
issue and seeks judgment in its favor on the breach of contract, 
trespass, and injunctive relief claims. In the Easement Agreement 
Burlington Northern agreed to pay $125,000 as full payment for all 
rent, damages and compensation of any sort, due for past occupancy 
of the right-of-way from date of construction in 1889 until January 
1, 1989. Thereafter, Burlington Northern would pay $10,000 per 
year, adjusted periodically based on the Consumer Price Index and 
changes in property values. The easement has an initial term of forty 
years, with two twenty-year extensions at Burlington Northern’s 
option. Burlington Northern promised to keep the Tribe informed as 
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to the nature and identity of all cargo transported by Burlington 
Northern across the Reservation through annual disclosures and to 
comply strictly with all Federal and State Regulations regarding 
classifying, packaging and handling of rail cars so as to provide the 
least risk and danger to persons, property and the natural 
environment of the Reservation. Burlington Northern also promised 
that unless otherwise agreed in writing, only one eastern bound train, 
and one western bound train would cross the Reservation each day. 
The number of trains and cars were not to be increased unless 
required by shipper needs. It is understood and agreed that if the 
number of crossings or the number of cars is increased, the annual 
rental will be subject to adjustment. The Tribe alleges that BNSF 
Railway Company, Burlington Northern’s successor, has breached 
the terms and conditions of the easement and that the overburdening 
of the right of way constitutes a trespass. Since at least 1999, BNSF 
had not complied with the cargo reporting requirement despite 
requests from the Tribe. In October 2011, the Tribe contacted BNSF 
about reports that Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company, LLC, 
one of the oil companies with operations in Anacortes, Washington, 
intended to ship, and BNSF intended to carry, crude oil in 100-car 
trains across the reservation. The Tribe reminded BNSF of its 
obligation to obtain written approval for any such increase in traffic 
and expressed concern regarding the impact of the proposed 
increase on the Tribe’s recently-completed hotel development 
project. BNSF did not respond. The Tribe sent a second letter in 
September 2012 when 100-car shipments from Tesoro began. In 
February 2013, BNSF confirmed that, in addition to the locals that 
serve the March Point refineries, unit trains of crude oil from North 
Dakota averaging 102 cars in each direction were crossing the 
reservation almost every day. The Tribe would not approve such 
shipments, and BNSF announced its intention to continue running 
the unit trains as it had been doing since 2012. This litigation 
followed, with the Tribe seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in 
addition to damages. The cross-motions for summary judgment 
raise three separate issues:  (1) whether there has been a breach of 
contract; (2) whether the ICCTA preempts the Tribe’s state law 
claims; and (3) whether the ICCTA preempts the remedies afforded 
by the Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) for breach of the Easement 
Agreement. The court granted in part and denied in part the cross-
motions for summary judgment. The Tribe is entitled to a 
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declaration that BNSF breached the terms of the Easement 
Agreement by failing to make annual disclosures regarding the 
cargo it was carrying across the reservation and by increasing the 
number of trains and cars traversing the reservation without first 
seeking to obtain the Tribe’s written assent. The state law claims for 
damages, compelled disclosures, and an adjustment in rent are not 
preempted by the ICCTA. To the extent the Tribe seeks an 
injunction limiting the type of cargo or the number of trains or cars 
crossing the reservation, whether under a breach of contract, 
trespass, or estoppel theory, those remedies are unavailable in this 
jurisdiction. The Tribe may seek a declaration of its contractual 
rights from the Surface Transportation Board and/or it may initiate 
the right of way cancellation procedures provided under in the 
International Right of Way Association and its implementing 
regulations.  
23. Navajo Nation v. United States Department of Interior. 
No. 16-5117, 852 F.3d 1124 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2017). Indian tribe 
brought action alleging that Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), an 
agency within Department of the Interior (DOI), violated Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) by 
failing to disburse certain funding. The district court, 174 F. Supp. 
3d 161, entered summary judgment in favor of DOI. Indian tribe 
appealed. The appellate court held that:  (1) deadline for BIA to 
approve or reject tribe's proposal began to run on date tribe hand 
delivered proposal during partial government shutdown to exempted 
employee at BIA regional office, rather than date furloughed BIA 
employee who was responsible for such proposals returned to office; 
(2) tribe's silence, in face of repeated assertions by BIA concerning 
deadline, did not equitably estop tribe from disputing timeliness of 
BIA's response; and (3)  partial government shutdown did not 
equitably toll deadline. Reversed.  
24. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Michigan 
No. 16-cv-10317, 2017 WL 3007074 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 14, 2017). On 
January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan and the Welfare Benefit Plan (Plaintiffs or the Tribe) 
brought suit against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). 
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Plaintiffs’ suit takes issue with BCBSM’s management of Plaintiffs’ 
“self-insured employee benefit Plan.”  The Counts which remain 
involve allegations that BCBSM charged Plaintiffs hidden fees. On 
April 10, 2017, the parties filed cross motions for partial summary 
judgment on the remaining Counts. The motions frame two issues:  
whether both of the Tribe’s two benefit plans are subject to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(b), et seq., and whether the fees collected for BCBSM’s 
Physician Group Incentive Program (PGIP) violated BCBSM’s 
fiduciary duties. ORDERED that, in accordance with Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 54, 56, and 58, on Count One and Count Two of 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint against Defendants as they relate to 
payment of hidden access fees for the Employee Plan, judgment is 
entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendant in the 
amount of $8,426,278.  
25. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and 
its Employee Welfare Plan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan 
No. 14-cv-11349, 2017 WL 3116262 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 21, 2017). 
This Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) case has 
been pending for over three years and is currently before the Court 
on defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan’s motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs Grand Traverse 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and its Employee Welfare 
Plan. Plaintiffs are a federally-recognized tribe and have filed suit 
against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) for breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA and have also brought five state-law 
claims allegedly relating to a contract between the tribe, BCBSM, 
and Munson Medical Center. Plaintiffs maintain a self-funded 
employee welfare plan (Plan) governed by the ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 
1001 et seq. In 2000, plaintiffs hired BCBSM to “provide 
administrative services for the processing and payment of claims” 
under the plan. In 2007, new federal regulations implementing 
section 506 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 went into effect (hereinafter MLR 
regulations). These regulations stated that “[a]ll Medicare-
participating hospitals . . . must accept no more than the rates of 
payment under the methodology described in this section as 
payment in full for all terms and services authorized by IHS, Tribal, 
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and urban Indian organization entities.”  And “if an amount has been 
negotiated with the hospital or its agent,” the tribe “will pay the 
lesser of” the amount determined by the methodology or the 
negotiated amount. None of the parties’ disputes that these 
regulations apply to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that defendant was 
“well aware of the MLR regulations” and “systematically failed to 
take advantage of MLR discounts available to Plaintiffs.”  And “[a]s 
administrator of an ERISA plan, BCBSM owed a number of 
fiduciary duties” to plaintiff that were breached due to this failure to 
take advantage of the MLR discounts. Plaintiffs seek restitution, 
statutory attorney fees, and other damages, costs, and interest. For 
the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED as to Count I, Count II, Count III (implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing only), Count IV, Count V, and Count VI.  
26. Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation, v. Wilbur D. 
Wilkinson, et al. 
No. 16-3715, 865 F.3d 1094, 2017 WL 3271313 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 
2017). Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation (Enerplus) 
mistakenly overpaid mineral royalties to Wilbur Wilkinson and 
demanded a return of the excess funds. In response, Wilkinson sued 
Enerplus in tribal court. Enerplus then filed suit in federal court, 
seeking the return of the excess funds and a declaration that the tribal 
court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The district court 
preliminarily enjoined Wilkinson from proceeding with his case in 
tribal court. Wilkinson appeals. Wilbur Wilkinson sued Peak North 
Dakota, LLC (Peak North) in tribal court. Subsequently, on October 
4, 2010, Peak North and Wilkinson entered into a “Settlement 
Agreement, Full Mutual Release, Waiver of Claims and Covenant 
Not to Sue” (Settlement Agreement), whereby Peak North agreed to 
assign Wilkinson an overriding royalty interest (ORRI) in certain oil 
and gas leases located in North Dakota. Pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement, Peak North and Wilkinson agreed that “any disputes 
arising under this Agreement and/or the transactions contemplated 
herein shall be resolved in the United States District Court for the 
District of North Dakota Northwest Division and such court shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction hereunder and no party shall have the 
right to contest such jurisdiction or venue.”  In December 2010, Peak 
North merged with and into Enerplus, with Enerplus being the 
surviving entity. Because of an alleged clerical error between 
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August 2014 and October 2015, Enerplus claims it overpaid the 
ORRI due to Wilkinson by $2,961,511.15. Upon discovering the 
error, Enerplus promptly, but unsuccessfully, sought return of the 
overpaid funds. On February 29, 2016, Wilkinson sued Enerplus in 
the Fort Berthold Tribal Court, alleging Enerplus breached the 
Settlement Agreement by underpaying Wilkinson. Enerplus 
subsequently brought this action in the federal district court, seeking 
(1) a preliminary injunction prohibiting Wilkinson from prosecuting 
any lawsuits in tribal court arising from or relating to the Settlement 
Agreement and prohibiting the tribal court from exercising 
jurisdiction over Enerplus in Wilkinson’s tribal court case, and 
(2) an order requiring that the overpaid ORRI be deposited into the 
district court’s registry. In response, Wilkinson moved to dismiss, 
arguing that (1) the Settlement Agreement is void, (2) Enerplus 
failed to exhaust tribal remedies, (3) the tribal court has jurisdiction, 
and (4) the requested preliminary injunction should be denied. The 
appellate court held that the district court’s preliminary injunction 
was “within the range of choice available to the district court, 
account[ed] for all relevant factors, d[id] not rely on any irrelevant 
factors, and d[id] not constitute a clear error of judgment.”  
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 
D. Employment 
27. Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians  
No. 15-13552, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18717 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 
2016). Christine J. Williams, the plaintiff below and appellant here, 
was employed for more than twenty-one years as the laboratory 
manager and chief medical technologist in the Health Department 
operated by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (the Poarch Band), a 
federally-recognized tribe of Native Americans. The Department is 
located on reservation lands, and positions within it are considered 
to be jobs of Tribal government. Plaintiff asserts that her 
employment was terminated because of her age (which she 
described as “over 55”), and that she was replaced by a 28-year-old 
female who “did not have enough experience to be a lab manager.”  
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court, 
alleging a single claim of discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(ADEA). The Poarch Band moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that 
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the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity deprived the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge to whom the action 
originally was assigned entered a report recommending that the 
motion be granted. Plaintiff’s objections were overruled by the 
District Court Judge, who adopted the Magistrate’s Report and 
Recommendation and dismissed the case. This appeal followed. The 
appellate court held that:  (1) There was no evidence that the Tribe 
waived its immunity, either generally or in the present suit; (2) The 
Fitzpatrick decision did not assist her in her argument that a 
comparison of the term employer found in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 with the ADEA’s definition of that same term 
demonstrated that Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity 
when enacting the ADEA; (3) The silence of the statutory text of the 
ADEA and its legislative history on the issue of whether Congress 
intended it apply to Indian tribes was ambiguous; (4) One could 
conclude that Congress never considered the ADEA’s impact upon 
Indian tribes; (5) The weight of authority in the federal courts 
supported upholding the right of the Tribe to tribal sovereign 
immunity from a claim based upon the ADEA. The court ruled that 
the Poarch Band is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from 
plaintiff’s ADEA claim and affirmed the district court’s decision to 
grant the Poarch Band’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Affirmed.  
28. Window Rock Unified School District et. al. v. Reeves et. al. 
No. 13-16259, No. 13-16278, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. Jun. 28, 2017). 
Public school districts that operated schools on land leased from 
Indian tribe brought action seeking declaratory judgment that tribal 
labor commission lacked jurisdiction over their employment 
decisions and practices conducted on reservation, and injunction to 
bar prosecution of their employees’ claims against them in tribal 
courts. The District Court, No. 3:12-cv-08059, 2013 WL 1149706, 
entered summary judgment in districts’ favor, and commission and 
employees appealed. The appellate court held that districts were 
required to exhaust their tribal remedies before seeking relief in 
federal court. Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
  
 
91 
E. Environmental Regulations 
29. Battle Mt. Band v. United States BLM 
No. 3:16-CV-0268-LRH-WGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115093 (D. 
Nev. Aug. 25, 2016). Before the court was plaintiff the Battle 
Mountain Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians’ 
(Band) renewed motion for a temporary restraining order which the 
court construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants 
the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Jill C. 
Silvey (collectively defendants), along with intervenor Carlin 
Resources, Inc. (Carlin), filed oppositions to the motion. This action 
involves the various agency decisions and federal permits issued by 
the BLM authorizing the construction of a power transmission line 
on land located in Elko County, Nevada that has been identified by 
the Band as its traditional cultural property (TCP) and has recently 
been deemed eligible by the BLM for inclusion on the National 
Register of Historic Places (National Register). Plaintiff Battle 
Mountain Band is one of four bands that comprise and make up the 
Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians (Te-Moak Tribe), a 
federally recognized Indian tribe. The Band currently resides on 
colony lands in close proximity to the Tosawihi Quarries. The Band 
contends that the entirety of the quarries, including the specific 
TCPs at issue in this action, are a vital spiritual, cultural, and 
economic center for the Band and other member bands of the Te-
Moak Tribe. According to the Band, the quarries contain various 
TCPs like sacred sites, burial grounds, ceremonial locations, 
spiritual trails, and hunting grounds as well as, medicinal and natural 
resources central to its history, culture, and identity. Defendant 
BLM is the federal agency responsible for overseeing and 
administering public lands, including the public lands on which the 
Tosawihi Quarries and the identified TCPs exist. As part of its 
administration of these lands, the BLM is authorized to issue permits 
and leases for use of the land. Approximately eight years ago, 
Carlin’s predecessors-in-interest applied for a permit from the BLM 
to convert certain land in the quarries from an exploratory mining 
area into a functional mining operation. Carlin, as the current owner 
of the mining rights, is the interested party to the various agency 
decisions and federal permits issued by the BLM. The Band argues 
that the public has a strong interest in the protection of historic 
property because Congress mandated a specific procedure for 
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federal agencies to follow as outlined in the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA). The court agrees. However, the court 
notes that there is a comparable public interest in the protection of a 
business’ reasonable investment-backed expectations when 
involved with government agencies. This public interest would be 
disserved by allowing the Band to attack a lengthy, expensive, and 
complex NHPA process years after the conclusion of the Record of 
Decision (ROD) and after an interested party like Carlin has 
invested millions of dollars in the project under that approved ROD. 
Further, the public’s interest in protecting historic properties was 
successfully engaged in during the Section 106 process. 
Accordingly, the court shall deny the Battle Mountain Band’s 
motion for preliminary injunctive relief.  
30. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army  
Corps of Eng’rs 
 
No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121997 (D.D.C. Sept. 
9, 2016). The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to block the operation of Corps 
permitting for the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The Tribe fears 
that construction of the pipeline, which runs within half a mile of its 
reservation in North and South Dakota, will destroy sites of cultural 
and historical significance. It filed a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, asserting principally that the Corps flouted its duty to 
engage in tribal consultations under the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) and that irreparable harm will ensue. The 
court concluded that the Corps likely complied with the NHPA and 
that the Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury that would be 
prevented by any injunction the Court could issue. The Motion was 
denied.  
31. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation 
v. United States Corps of Eng’rs 
No. 3:11-CV-03026-RAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134399 (D.S.D. 
Sep. 29, 2016). Plaintiffs Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake 
Traverse Reservation (Tribe) and Robert Shepherd, the Tribe’s then-
Chairman, filed a Complaint and Amended Complaint seeking 
declaratory, injunctive, and other relief. Plaintiffs named as 
Defendants the United States Corps of Engineers (Corps), Steven E. 
  
 
93 
Naylor, in his official capacity as Regulatory Program Manager, and 
Robert J. Ruch, in his official capacity as District Commander. 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint challenged the Corps granting of certain 
exemptions and permits under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to 
Merlyn Drake (Drake), and how it has dealt generally with Drake’s 
requests and conduct on land adjacent to Enemy Swim Lake, which 
is within the exterior boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation. This 
lawsuit centered on the Tribe’s concern about development at 
Enemy Swim Lake within the Lake Traverse Reservation in South 
Dakota. The Tribe considers Enemy Swim Lake (Toka Nuwan 
Yapi) to be of tremendous cultural and religious significance. There 
are burial grounds at and near the lake, plants from the lake are used 
in ceremonies and for medicinal purposes, some tribal members 
spear and catch fish for sustenance from the lake, and many tribal 
members consider Enemy Swim Lake to be a sacred place. The land 
surrounding the lake is owned by the Tribe, tribal members, and 
non-tribal members. Drake, who is not a member of the Tribe, owns 
land adjoining Enemy Swim Lake. Drake has been constructing the 
farm roads and bridge, which are approximately one mile in length 
and travel through an inlet to and crossing near the shoreline of 
Enemy Swim Lake. Certain of Drake’s prior receipt of exemptions 
and permits for activities on this property challenged in this 
litigation were time barred or otherwise dismissed. The remaining 
issues in this case involve certain exemptions and permits under the 
CWA received in 2006 and 2009 by Drake from the Corps relating 
to excavation and extraction activities to create farm roads and a 
bridge to improve access to a portion of Drake’s land. The Court 
denied Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against the Corps, 
remanded to the Corps for reconsideration whether the 2009 gully 
crossings were the type of undertaking that could affect historic 
properties under 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a) and to complete the Section 
106 process if so necessary, and denied all other requests for relief 
requested by Plaintiffs. 
32. Karuk Tribe v. Stelle 
No. 16-15818, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21637 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 
2016). Karuk Tribe and various environmental organizations 
invoked the provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), and the National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e), to seek a 
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preliminary injunction blocking the government’s salvage logging 
in a large burned area of the Klamath National Forest. The district 
court denied the preliminary injunction, and the logging project, 
known as the Westside Fire Recovery Project, continues to go 
forward. Plaintiffs appeal. We review the denial for abuse of 
discretion. There was none. The salvage logging has been 
undertaken to reduce the likelihood of more severe fires in the 
future. Plaintiffs’ concern is with the loss of snags that are beneficial 
to owl and salmon habitats. The government was required, under the 
NFMA, to comply with the Klamath Forest Plan that spells out 
requirements for the retention of snags. The project met those 
requirements. The government’s efforts to preserve large snags 
included (1) retaining large “legacy” green trees; (2) leaving 
untouched snags in hydrologic riparian areas; (3) designating 
additional snag retention areas; and (4) reducing surface fuels, 
which decreases the risk that future fire consumes even more snags. 
Plaintiffs rely on our decision in Oregon Nat. Res. Council Fund v. 
Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007), where we affirmed the 
entry of an injunction to prevent snag removal by means of clear 
cutting on a large scale and undertaken for governmental profit. 
Here, the Forest Service’s motives are to prevent the danger of 
future fires, not economic gain, and the government has gone to 
pains to avoid the risks of large-scale clear cutting envisioned in 
Brong. Assuming that Plaintiffs have raised serious questions 
concerning the logging in riparian reserves under the NFMA, the 
equities favor the government because of the long term 
environmental, safety and economic benefits. See Earth Island Inst. 
v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010). With respect to the 
ESA, National Marine Fisheries Service did not rely significantly, if 
at all, on the Forest Service’s planned mitigation measures in 
reaching its no jeopardy conclusion. Plaintiffs cannot show a 
likelihood of success under the ESA. AFFIRMED. 
33. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. 
United States DOI 
No. 13-55704, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22919 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 
2016). HOLDINGS:  (1) The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
did not improperly fail to determine whether a proposed wind 
energy facility met the substantive requirements of a desert 
conservation area plan since the BLM properly amended the plan to 
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accommodate the project, and the project was governed by the plan 
amendment rather than the plan itself; (2) The project was properly 
assigned an interim classification for the least restrictive amount of 
permissible change to the existing character of the landscape since 
the classification was included in the properly adopted amendment 
to the plan; (3) The BLM did not fail to consider the cumulative 
impacts of alternative energy projects on lands in the desert 
conservation area since the BLM sufficiently assessed the effects on 
visual and cultural resources, identified reasonably foreseeable 
future projects, and described the existing damage to cultural 
resources. Judgment affirmed. 
34. Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperium Terminal Services, 
LLC 
No. 92552-6, 387 P.3d 670 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017). Owners of 
terminals for storing petroleum products applied for substantial 
shoreline development permit (SSDP) based on plans to expand 
their operations. After the Department of Ecology (DOE) and the 
city issued mitigated determinations of nonsignificance (MDNS) 
and permits, a Native American tribe and citizens groups appealed. 
The Shoreline Hearings Board granted motions for partial summary 
judgment. Tribe and citizens group appealed to the Court of 
Appeals, which accepted direct review. The appellate court, 190 
Wash. App. 696, 360 P.3d 949, affirmed Board’s grant of summary 
judgment. Tribe and citizens group sought review by Supreme 
Court, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that:  
(1) owners’ proposed expansion projects, which would facilitate the 
storage of additional fuel products that would arrive by train or truck 
and depart by ocean-bound ship, triggered review of owners’ permit 
applications under Ocean Resources Management Act’s (ORMA) 
statutory framework; (2) owners’ proposed expansion projects 
qualified as “ocean uses” as defined in DOE’s regulation 
implementing ORMA; (3) owners’ proposed expansion projects 
qualified as “transportation” as defined in DOE’s regulation 
implementing ORMA; and (4) owners’ proposed expansion projects 
qualified as “coastal uses” as defined in DOE’s regulation 
implementing ORMA. Reversed and remanded. 
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35. Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Black 
No. 14cv2261 JLS (JMA), 2017 WL 882278 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 
2017). Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Tule Wind LLC plans to construct a number of 
wind turbines in southeastern San Diego County. The project 
consists of two phases. Phase I involves sixty-five turbines on 
federal land in the McCain Valley, and Phase II comprises twenty 
turbines on land held in trust for the Ewiiaapaayp Band of 
Kumeyaay Indians (the Tribe) on ridgelines above the McCain 
Valley. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved Phase I 
in 2011. This lawsuit pertains to BIA’s approval of Phase II. In 
2011—prior to approval of either phase—BLM issued a Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its implementing 
regulations. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) served as a cooperating 
agency on the EIS, which therefore permitted BIA to “use the 
EIR/EIS for [its own] approval processes” and “for consideration of 
[its own] required discretionary actions.” Although BIA ultimately 
adopted several eagle-specific mitigation measures in authorizing 
Phase II, determining that the adopted mitigation “scenario 
significantly reduces potential ‘take’ of golden eagles during 
operation for the life of the Proposed Action[,]” and that Phase II 
“would not create significant impacts after the implementation of 
mitigation measures contained in the [record of decision] (ROD) 
and the acquisition of all permits required by law.” In authorizing 
Phase II, the BIA considered the EIS, the “overall administrative 
record,” and “BIA’s mission to foster economic development for 
tribes.” The court found that because (1) the BIA permissibly relied 
on the 2011 Environmental Impact Statement, which it helped 
prepare; (2) the 2011 EIS rigorously considered Tule Phase II’s 
potential risk to golden eagles; and (3) no new information or 
developments triggered NEPA’s supplementation requirements, the 
Court concludes that BIA validly exercised its discretion in 
approving Tule Phase II. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and DENIES 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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36. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army  
Corps of Eng’rs 
 
No. 16-1534 (JEB),  2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31967 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 
2017). Since last summer, the question of whether Dakota Access 
should route its oil pipeline near the reservations of American Indian 
tribes has engendered substantial debate both on the ground in North 
and South Dakota and here in Washington. This Court, meanwhile, 
has focused on the specific legal challenges raised by the Standing 
Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes in their efforts to block 
government permitting of the pipeline. See Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Standing Rock I), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 121997, 2016 WL 4734356 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016). At 
the start of 2017, that pipeline was nearly complete, save a stretch, 
awaiting an easement, that was designed to run under the bed of 
Lake Oahe, a federally regulated waterway that forms part of the 
Missouri River and straddles North and South Dakota. Upon 
assuming office, President Trump directed an expedited approval 
process, and on February 8, the Army Corps of Engineers issued the 
easement that permitted Dakota Access to drill under the lake. 
Fearing that the presence of oil in the pipeline under Lake Oahe will 
cause irreparable harm to its members’ religious exercise, Cheyenne 
River responded with a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in which 
it argues that the easement’s grant violates the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and requests that the 
Court enjoin the effect of the easement and thus the flow of oil, 
which is expected to commence in the next week or two. As the 
Court concludes that the extraordinary relief requested is not 
appropriate in light of both the equitable doctrine of laches and the 
Tribe’s unlikelihood of success on the merits, it will deny the 
Motion.  
37. Round Valley Indian Tribes of Cal. v. United States DOT 
No. 15-cv-04987-JSW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34923 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 10, 2017). This litigation arises out of a highway project that 
is under construction around the community of Willits, California 
(the Willits Bypass Project). Plaintiffs, the Coyote Valley Band of 
Pomo Indians of California (Coyote Valley) and the Round Valley 
Indian Tribes of California (Round Valley) (collectively Plaintiffs), 
allege the Federal Defendants violated the National Environmental 
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Protection Act (NEPA), Section 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. section 303(f) (Section 4(f)), Section 
18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. section 138 
(Section 18(a)), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). 
On July 1, 2007, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
defendant California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), in 
which the FHWA assigned certain responsibilities and liabilities for 
various projects, including the Willits Bypass Project, to Caltrans, 
pursuant to the Surface Transportation Project Pilot Delivery 
Program (the Pilot Program), 23 U.S.C. section 327. However, 
Caltrans did not assume the Federal Defendants’ responsibilities for 
government-to-government consultation under the NHPA. Plaintiffs 
allege all Defendants, including the Federal Defendants:  (1) failed 
to properly identify and protect the Plaintiffs’ “ancestral, sacred, 
cultural, and archeological sites and resources;” and (2) destroyed 
certain sites during the construction of the Willits Bypass Project. 
Plaintiffs also allege all Defendants, including the Federal 
Defendants, failed to “(a) adequately address the direct, indirect, and 
cumulative cultural, environmental, and historic impacts of the 
Willits Bypass Project; (b) identify and finalize the details of the 
mitigation plan or its environmental and cultural impacts; and 
(c) commit to necessary mitigation measures.”  On October 30, 
2015, Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this case. On August 
2, 2016, the Court granted the Federal Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. The Court concluded that the terms of the MOU would bar 
Plaintiffs’ claims under NEPA and Section 4(f) and Section 18(a). 
The Court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend, and it directed Plaintiffs 
to specifically identify which Defendant acted, or failed to act, in a 
particular manner. On August 24, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the first 
amended complaint (FAC). In sum, the Court concludes Plaintiffs 
have alleged facts to state a claim based on alleged failure to engage 
in a government-to-government consultation process under NHPA. 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court grants, in part, and 
denies, in part the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  
38. Hopi Tribe v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
No. 14-73055, 2017 WL 1046116, 851 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 
2017). Indian tribe petitioned for review of Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) federal implementation plan under the 
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Clean Air Act (CAA) for reduction of emissions from a coal-fired 
generating station, which tribe contended would result in the plant’s 
closure with resulting harm to tribe’s economic interests. The 
Appellate Court held that EPA did not violate any duty of the 
Government to consult with Indian tribe during rulemaking process. 
Petition denied. 
39. Yazzie v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
No. 14-73100, No. 14-73101, No. 14-73102, 2017 WL 1046117, 
851 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017). Tribal conservation 
organizations and non-profit environmental organizations petitioned 
for review of United States Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) source-specific federal implementation plan (FIP) under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) for a coal-fired power plant on the Navajo 
Nation Reservation in Arizona. The Appellate Court held that:  
(1) federal government’s partial ownership of power plant did not 
weigh against affording deference to EPA’s interpretation of CAA 
and its implementing regulations; (2) EPA’s determination that 
Tribal Authority Rule (TAR) applied to Navajo Nation was 
reasonable; (3) FIP was not subject to CAA regional haze program’s 
requirement that all necessary emission reductions take place during 
the period of the first long-term strategy for regional haze; (4) EPA 
was not required to show by clear weight of the evidence that its FIP 
was better than best alternative retrofit technology (BART); 
(5) EPA’s interpretation of phrase “distribution of emissions” as 
used in Regional Haze Regulation was reasonable; and (6) it was 
reasonable for EPA to give plant emission credit when evaluating 
whether FIP alternative resulted in greater emissions reductions than 
the BART. Petition denied.  
40. Navajo Nation v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. 
No. CV-17-8007-PCT-DLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77568 (D. 
Ariz. May 22, 2017). The Navajo Nation filed an unopposed motion 
to enter the parties’ proposed consent decree (CD). The United 
States filed a similar motion in its related suit against Defendants. 
(No. CV-17-00140-DLR.)  The Court granted the motions, finding 
the CD to be fair, reasonable, and consistent with the objectives of 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA). The United States, on behalf of the 
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), filed a complaint in this matter pursuant to Sections 
  
 
100 
106 and 107 of the CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 and 9607, against 
Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (Cyprus Amax) and Western 
Nuclear, Inc. (Western Nuclear) (collectively, Settling Defendants). 
The Navajo Nation filed a complaint in this matter pursuant to 
Section 107 of CERCLA and Sections 2403, 2501 and 2503 of the 
Navajo Nation CERCLA (NNCERCLA), 4 N.N.C. §§ 2403, 2501 
and 2503, against Settling Defendants. The United States and the 
Navajo Nation (collectively, Plaintiffs), in their complaint against 
the Settling Defendants, each seek, inter alia: (1) reimbursement of 
Past and Future Response Costs incurred, in the case of the United 
States, by EPA and other federal agencies, and in the case of the 
Navajo Nation, by the Navajo Nation, including the Navajo Nation 
EPA (NNEPA) and the Navajo Nation DOJ (NNDOJ), for response 
actions at the abandoned uranium mine sites and one transfer station 
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, located on Navajo Nation lands, 
and listed in Appendix A (Mine Sites), together with accrued 
interest; and (2) performance of response actions by Settling 
Defendants at the Mine Sites consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (NCP). Settling Defendants 
do not admit any liability to Plaintiffs arising out of the transactions 
or occurrences alleged in the complaints, do not admit that any 
release or threatened release of hazardous substances occurred while 
they operated any Mine Site, nor do they acknowledge that the 
release or threatened release of hazardous substance(s) at or from 
any of the Mine Sites constitutes an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment. 
Settling Federal Agencies do not admit any liability arising out of 
the transactions or occurrences as may be alleged in any claims by 
the Navajo Nation or counterclaims by Settling Defendants. Based 
on the information presently available to EPA and the Navajo 
Nation, EPA and the Navajo Nation believe that the Work at the 
Mine Sites will be promptly conducted by Settling Defendants if 
conducted in accordance with this CD and its appendices. The 
Parties recognize, and the Court by entering this CD finds, that this 
CD has been negotiated by the Parties in good faith and 
implementation of this CD will expedite the cleanup of the Mine 
Sites and will avoid prolonged and complicated litigation between 
the Parties, and that this CD is fair, reasonable, and in the public 
interest.  
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F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
41. United States v. Washington 
No. 13-35474, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3816, 853 F.3d 946  (9th Cir. 
Mar. 2, 2017). The panel amended the opinion filed on June 27, 
2016, and affirmed the district court’s order issuing an injunction 
directing the State of Washington to correct culverts, which allow 
streams to flow underneath roads, because they violated, and 
continued to violate, the Stevens Treaties, which were entered in 
1854-55 between Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the 
Governor of Washington Territory. In 1970, the United States 
brought suit against the State of Washington on behalf of the Tribes 
to resolve a persistent conflict over fishing rights; and in a 1974 
decision, the district court authorized the parties to invoke its 
continuing jurisdiction to resolve continuing disputes. The panel 
held that in building and maintaining barrier culverts within the Case 
Area, Washington violated, and was continuing to violate, its 
obligation to the Tribes under the Treaties. The panel also held that 
because treaty rights belong to the Tribes rather than the United 
States, it was not the prerogative of the United States to waive them. 
Concerning the State of Washington’s cross-request seeking an 
injunction that would require the United States to fix its culverts 
before Washington repaired its culverts, the panel held that 
Washington’s cross-request was barred by sovereign immunity, and 
Washington did not have standing to assert any treaty rights 
belonging to the Tribes. Specifically, the panel held that 
Washington’s cross-request for an injunction did not qualify as 
a claim for recoupment. The panel held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in enjoining Washington to correct most of its 
high-priority barrier culverts within seventeen years, and to correct 
the remainder at the end of their natural life or in the course of a road 
construction project undertaken for independent reasons. The panel 
rejected Washington’s objections that the injunction was too broad, 
that the district court did not defer to the State’s expertise, that the 
court did not properly consider costs and equitable principles, that 
the injunction impermissibly intruded into state government 
operations, and that the injunction was inconsistent with federalism 
principles. Judgment affirmed. 
42. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella 
Valley Water District 
No. 15-55896,  849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2017). Indian tribe 
brought action against water district and desert water agency, 
seeking to have the court declare and quantify its federally reserved 
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rights to groundwater underlying its reservation and enjoin district 
and agency from interfering with tribe’s rights to groundwater. 
Federal government intervened as a plaintiff. The District Court, No. 
5:13-cv-00883-JGB-SP, 2015 WL 1600065, entered partial 
summary judgment in favor of tribe and government. District and 
agency appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) federal 
government impliedly reserved general water right when it 
established Indian reservation in desert; (2) tribe’s implied general 
reserved water right extended to groundwater; and (3) any state 
water entitlements that tribe had to groundwater did not limit tribe’s 
federal implied water right. Affirmed. 
43. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Forsman 
No. C16-5639 RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42730 (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 23, 2017). Before the Court was Defendant Suquamish Indian 
Tribe and its Tribal Councilmembers’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff 
Skokomish Indian Tribe’s claims against them. Skokomish Tribe 
sued Councilmembers and Fisheries Director of the Suquamish 
Tribe, alleging they violated Skokomish’s hunting rights by 
allowing their tribal members to hunt in Skokomish’s territory. 
Skokomish claims the Point No Point Treaty reserved to it the 
primary and exclusive hunting right within “Twana Territory.”  The 
Skokomish Tribe is a successor in interest to the Skokomish and 
Twana people. The 1855 Treaty of Point No Point is one of several 
treaties executed by Governor Stevens reserving hunting and fishing 
rights to its signatory tribes (the Stevens Treaties). In 1985, this 
Court confirmed Skokomish’s primary fishing right in Twana 
Territory, roughly, Hood Canal. Skokomish argues the Court also 
confirmed its primary hunting right in Twana Territory. Skokomish 
alleges Defendants unlawfully promulgated and enforced hunting 
regulations allowing Suquamish hunting in Twana Territory. It 
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief confirming its primary 
hunting right and enjoining the Suquamish Tribe’s enforcement of 
unlawful hunting in Twana Territory. Defendants seek dismissal of 
Skokomish’s claims on four grounds: (1) Skokomish lacks 
Article III standing, (2) the suit against the Suquamish Tribe is 
barred by sovereign immunity, (3) legislative immunity precludes 
suit against Suquamish Tribal Officials promulgating hunting 
regulations, and (4) Skokomish failed to join the Suquamish Tribe 
and other Stevens Treaty Tribes as indispensable parties. 
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Defendants point out that Skokomish recently sued a host of state 
officials, asserting the same claims and seeking similar relief, in 
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Goldmark, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1193 
(W.D. Wash. 2014). Judge Robart dismissed that case because the 
adjudication of the signatory tribes’ hunting rights in the region 
required Skokomish to join all of the tribes in one action, which it 
could not do. Skokomish argues this Court has jurisdiction because 
Defendant’s unlawful hunting caused a concrete injury, redressable 
by a favorable judgment of this Court. Skokomish also argues Ex 
Parte Young, an exception to the Suquamish Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity, allows this Court to grant injunctive relief enjoining the 
Suquamish Tribal Officers’ unlawful acts. It argues that legislative 
immunity does not bar the suit because Suquamish Tribal Officers 
acted in their administrative and executive, not legislative, 
capacities in passing and enforcing hunting regulations. The Court 
granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Skokomish’s failure to 
join indispensable parties. Skokomish’s claims were dismissed 
without prejudice.  
44. Wild Fish Conservancy, et al. v. National Park Service, et 
al. 
No. 14-35791, 2017 WL 1381128, 687 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 18, 2017). In a series of decisions, the Department of the 
Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
approved the use of hatcheries operated by the State of Washington 
and the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe (the Tribe) to restore Elwha 
River fish populations after a dam removal project. The Wild Fish 
Conservancy and others (collectively, the Conservancy) claim in 
this action that the Department and NMFS violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) and that the Tribe's hatchery operations were “taking” 
threatened fish in violation of the ESA. The district court correctly 
held that NMFS's decision to prepare an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) instead of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before 
approving the hatchery programs under Limit 6 was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. See Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
428 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining standard of 
review). The Department had previously endorsed the use of 
hatcheries in the Elwha River in a 1996 EIS and decision. See Or. 
Nat. Res. Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989) 
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(finding supplemental EIS not required where previous EIS and 
comprehensive management plan “had already contemplated” 
agency actions “of the type and magnitude proposed”). The 
subsequent EA reasonably concluded, after thorough analysis, that 
the risks posed by the hatchery programs were minimal and that 
approving the programs would have no significant impact on the 
environment. Because the EA satisfied NMFS's NEPA obligations, 
it also satisfied the Department's NEPA obligations. The 
Department participated in preparing the EA, and the EA expressly 
considered the effects of the Department's funding actions. The 
district court correctly found the Conservancy's initial claim that the 
Tribe was taking fish without authorization moot in light of NMFS's 
Limit 6 approval and Incidental Take Statement.  
45. United States v. Washington 
No. 13-35474, 2017 WL 2193387 (9th Cir. May 19, 2017). The 
panel denied a petition for a panel rehearing and denied a petition 
for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court in an action in which the 
panel affirmed the district court’s injunction directing the State of 
Washington to correct culverts, which allow streams to flow 
underneath roads, because they violated, and continued to violate, 
the Stevens Treaties, which were entered in 1854–55 between Indian 
tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the Governor of Washington 
Territory. Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judges W. 
Fletcher and Gould stated that the district court properly found that 
Washington State violated the Treaties by acting affirmatively to 
build state-owned roads, and to build and maintain salmon-blocking 
culverts under those roads. The Judges stated that there is ample 
evidence that remediation of the State’s barrier culverts will have a 
substantial beneficial effect on salmon populations, resulting in 
more harvestable salmon for the Tribes. As an incidental result, 
there will also be more harvestable salmon for non-Indians. The 
district court crafted a careful, nuanced injunction, giving the United 
States much less than it requested. The Judges stated that the district 
court properly found a violation of the Treaties by the State, and that 
it acted within its discretion in formulating its remedial injunction. 
In an opinion respecting the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge 
O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Kozinski, Tallman, Callahan, Bea, 
Ikuta and N.R. Smith, and joined by Judges Bybee and M. Smith as 
to all but Part IV, stated that the panel opinion’s reasoning ignored 
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 
(1979), and this Circuit’s cases, was incredibly broad, and if left 
unchecked, could significantly affect natural resource management 
throughout the Pacific Northwest, inviting judges to become 
environmental regulators. Judge O’Scannlain stated that by refusing 
to consider the doctrine of laches, the panel opinion further 
disregarded the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). The 
petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc, filed 
August 11, 2016, are DENIED.  
46. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States 
No. 16-760 C, 132 Fed. Cl. 408, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 604 (Fed. 
Cl. June 1, 2017). Plaintiff Crow Creek sued the United States 
through the Department of the Interior alleging a Fifth Amendment 
taking of its reserved water rights. See Winters v. United States, 207 
U.S. 564, 576-78, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908). Defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant also contends that the 
Government’s bare trust relationship with Crow Creek does not 
provide the “money-mandating” statute or regulation necessary for 
jurisdiction in this court. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 
400 (1976). Plaintiff’s pleadings do not show how damages from an 
alleged taking could have accrued currently, and oral arguments did 
not clarify this threshold issue. Nevertheless, plaintiff urged the 
court to permit sufficient discovery for it to address defendant’s 
jurisdictional arguments. Given the opportunity to inquire into the 
extent of defendant’s diversion of its rights in the waters of the 
Missouri River, the Tribe argued it would be able to definitively 
establish damages. For example, counsel stated during oral 
arguments that plaintiff could hire experts to submit reports on 
various methods of obtaining appraised values for those waters. 
Plaintiff believes that those values would supply evidence of the 
damages that its case now lacks. In this case, however, opening 
discovery in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss would result 
in a waste of resources for both parties. The jurisdictional problem 
of standing or ripeness arises from plaintiff’s inability to identify an 
injury to the Tribe that has yet occurred. If we were to permit 
discovery for the purposes that plaintiff proposes, that effort could 
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only establish the value of water that has been diverted from the 
Missouri River over a period of time. Such a value would not equate 
to damages suffered by the Tribe in the circumstances of this case. 
For these reasons, we GRANT defendant’s motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b)(1).  
47. Penobscot Nation v. Mills 
Nos. 16-1424, 16-1435, 16-1474, 16-1482, 861 F.3d 324 (1st Cir. 
Jun. 30, 2017). American Indian tribe brought action against state of 
Maine and various state officials, in response to opinion of state 
attorney general regarding regulatory jurisdiction of tribe and state 
related to hunting and fishing on stretch of river, seeking declaratory 
judgment clarifying boundaries of tribe’s reservation and tribal 
fishing rights on river. United States intervened on its own behalf 
and as a trustee for tribe, and private interests, towns and other 
political entities intervened in support of state defendants. The 
District Court, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, ruled that tribe’s reservation 
included river’s islands but not its waters, and sustenance fishing 
rights provided in reservation’s implementing statute allowed tribe 
to take fish for sustenance in entirety of relevant stretch of river, and 
issued declaratory relief as to both points. Parties cross-appealed. 
The appellate court held that: (1) under Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement Act (MICSA), Penobscot Indian Reservation included 
only islands in the main stem of the Penobscot River which were 
included in Maine Implementing Act (MIA), but did not include any 
of the waters of the River itself, any portion thereof, or the 
submerged lands underneath; (2) tribe lacked Article III standing to 
bring claim seeking declaratory judgment clarifying tribal fishing 
rights on river; and (3) tribe’s claim against defendants, seeking 
declaratory judgment clarifying tribal fishing rights on stretch of 
river, was not ripe for adjudication. Affirmed in part and vacated in 
part. 
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G. Gaming 
48. United Auburn Indian Cmty. of the Auburn Rancheria v. 
Brown 
No. C075126, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 858 (Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016). 
[See also Citizens for a Better Way v. Brown, No. C075018, 2016 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7409 (Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016)]. In 2002 
the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise 
Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the 
Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the 
purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to 
statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or 
without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land 
for Indians. The Governor gave his concurrence and simultaneously 
executed a tribal-state gaming compact for the Yuba County site. A 
competing gaming establishment, the plaintiff and appellant, which 
is owned by the United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn 
Rancheria (Auburn Tribe), challenged the validity of the Governor’s 
concurrence on the ground it constituted an illegal exercise of 
legislative power, which was neither delegated to the Governor, nor 
ancillary and incidental to his power to enter into gaming compacts 
with Indian tribes. The court disagreed on the ground the exercise of 
the power of concurrence is not legislative. The Auburn Tribe 
argued that even though federal law singles out the Governor as the 
arm of the state that must concur in the Secretary’s determination 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that land acquired 
after 1988 is suitable for Indian gaming, no state law authorizes the 
Governor to so act. The Auburn Tribe maintains that such action is 
a legislative act that must be performed by the Legislature unless 
delegated to the Governor. The Auburn Tribe argued that the 
Governor’s power to concur with the Secretary’s determination that 
land acquired after 1988 is suitable for gaming, is not necessary to 
the Governor’s authority to negotiate and conclude class III gaming 
compacts. Therefore, it argued the power to concur cannot be said 
to be ancillary or incidental to the Governor’s legislative 
authorization to enter into class III gaming compacts with Indian 
tribes. The court took issue with the Auburn Tribe’s underlying 
premise that the power to concur in the Secretary’s determination is 
clearly a legislative power. Nothing about the Governor’s 
concurrence defeated or materially impaired this function. The 
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Governor’s power to concur has the characteristics of an executive, 
rather than a legislative act, thus the Governor’s power does not 
depend on legislative delegation. The court concluded that the 
Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers 
clause and also concluded that the concurrence is not a project under 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because the 
Governor is not a public agency. The appellate court affirmed the 
judgment.  
49. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida 
No. 4:15cv516-RH/CAS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155708 (N.D. Fla. 
Nov. 9, 2016). The Seminole Tribe of Florida operates casinos under 
a Compact entered into with the State of Florida under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (IGRA). The 
Compact became effective in 2010 and has a 20-year term. The 
Compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct banked card games, 
blackjack, for example, only during the first five years. That period 
has now ended. But there is an exception to the five-year limitation. 
The limitation does not apply, the Tribe may continue to conduct 
banked card games for the entire 20-year term, if “the State permits 
any other person [except another tribe] to conduct such games.”  The 
Tribe and the State have filed lawsuits against one another that have 
been consolidated. The cases present two central issues: whether the 
exception to the five-year limitation has been triggered; and whether 
the State has breached a duty under IGRA to negotiate in good faith 
for a modification of the Compact. This order declares that the 
exception has been triggered—that the Tribe may conduct banked 
card games for the Compact’s 20-year term. The order awards no 
further relief on the failure-to-negotiate claim.  
50. Stand Up For Cal.! v. State of Cal. 
No. F069302, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 1078 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2016). Plaintiffs Stand Up for California! and Barbara Leach 
initiated this litigation by filing a complaint challenging the 
Governor’s authority to concur in the decision of the Secretary of 
the United States Department of the Interior to take land in Madera 
County into trust for defendant North Fork Rancheria of Mono 
Indians for the purpose of operating a casino for class III gaming. 
The Governor’s concurrence was a necessary element under federal 
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law for the granting of permission to North Fork to operate the 
casino on the land. While the case was pending, the Legislature 
passed a statute ratifying a compact previously negotiated and 
executed with North Fork by the Governor. This compact is a device 
authorized by federal law to allow a state to agree with an Indian 
tribe on the terms and conditions under which gambling can take 
place on Indian land within the state. Plaintiffs then initiated 
Proposition 48, a referendum by which, at the 2014 general election, 
the voters disapproved the ratification statute. The result was that 
the land remained in trust for North Fork, but the compact was not 
ratified, so class III gaming on the land was not approved. 
Subsequently, however, as a product of federal litigation between 
North Fork and the state, a set of procedures designed to function as 
an alternative to a state-approved compact was approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior. Appeals were filed from both judgments of 
dismissal, but the parties agreed to dismiss North Fork’s appeal in 
the case challenging the referendum, leaving only the concurrence 
issue. The court held:  After a referendum in which the voters 
defeated the Legislature’s ratification under Gov. Code, § 12012.25, 
and Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f), of a tribal-state compact for 
gaming on newly acquired tribal land under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., the Governor did not have 
implied power to concur in a federal determination allowing gaming 
under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(I)(A) because the state was not 
exercising any express power from which an implied power could 
be derived. The concurrence power was not inherent in the 
Governor’s authority under Cal. Const., art. V, § 1, absent a state-
approved compact. The Governor’s authority regarding 
communication and information under Gov. Code, § 12012, and 
Cal. Const., art. V, § 4, did not extend to a concurrence. Because the 
Legislature’s ratification was defeated, it provided no authority. 
Reversed and remanded. The judgment was reversed. The 
Governor’s concurrence is invalid under the facts alleged in this 
case. Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for a writ of mandate to 
set the concurrence aside on the ground that it is unsupported by 
legal authority.  
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51. Frank’s Landing Indian Community v. National Indian 
Gaming Comm’n 
No. C15-5828BHS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37218 (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 15, 2017). Prior History:  Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v. 
Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108581 
(W.D. Wash., Aug. 15, 2016). This matter comes before the Court 
on the motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Frank’s Landing 
Indian Community (the Community). Also, before the Court is the 
cross-motion for summary judgment of the Defendants. The 
“Community filed its complaint against the National Indian Gaming 
Commission (the Commission) seeking injunctive and declaratory 
relief that it qualifies as an Indian tribe under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. (IGRA). The 
Commission and the Chairman moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the 
Commission and the Chairman’s motion to dismiss, explaining that 
“the Community’s dispute regarding qualification under the IGRA 
as an ‘Indian tribe’ is with the Secretary and not with the 
[Commission] or the Chairman.”  The Community moved for 
summary judgment. Defendants responded with their cross-motion 
for summary judgment. The Community is a self-governing 
dependent Indian community located along the Nisqually River near 
Olympia, Washington. In 1987, Congress recognized the members 
of the Community “as eligible for the special programs and services 
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 
Indians” and “as eligible to contract, and to receive grants, under the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act for such 
services.”  Pub. L. No. 100-153, § 10, 101 Stat. 886, 889 (1987) (the 
“1987 Frank’s Landing Act”). In 1994, Congress amended the law. 
The Commission referred the matter to Interior’s Office of the 
Solicitor, requesting an opinion on whether the Community is a tribe 
within the meaning of the IGRA, who referred the matter to the 
Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs (“AS-IA”), Kevin Washburn. 
On March 6, 2015, the AS-IA issued a memorandum to the 
Commission  Chairman conveying Interior’s conclusion that the 
Community is not an Indian tribe within the meaning of the IGRA 
because it is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Therefore, it is 
hereby ORDERED that:  1. The Community’s motion for summary 
judgment is DENIED; and 2. Defendants’ cross-motion for 
summary judgment is GRANTED.  
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52. Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head 
(Aquinnah) 
No. 16-1137, 853 F.3d 618, 2017 WL 1315642 (1st Cir. Apr. 10, 
2017). Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought action in a 
Commonwealth court alleging that federally recognized Indian 
tribe's efforts to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal 
trust lands, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 
without having obtained a license from the Commonwealth violated 
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987 (Massachusetts 
Settlement Act). Following removal, town and community 
association intervened and tribe filed counterclaim and third-party 
claims against Commonwealth and Commonwealth officials. 
Parties and intervenors moved for summary judgment. The District 
Court, 144 F. Supp. 3d 152, entered summary judgment for 
Commonwealth and intervenors. Tribe appealed. The appellate 
court held that: (1) tribe made necessary threshold showing that it 
exercised jurisdiction over the Settlement Lands at issue; (2) tribe 
exercised sufficient governmental power to trigger application of 
IGRA to Settlement Lands; and (3) IGRA effected partial repeal of 
Settlement Act. Reversed.  
53. State of Kansas ex. Rel. Schmidt v. Zinke  
No. 16-3015, 861 F.3d 1024, 2017 WL 2766292 (10th Cir. Jun. 27, 
2017). State of Kansas and board of county commissioners brought 
action against National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), 
arguing that legal opinion letter regarding eligibility of Indian lands 
for gaming was arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous as a matter of 
law. The District Court, 2017 WL 2766292, dismissed action. State 
and county appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) NIGC Acting 
General Counsel’s legal opinion letter was not a reviewable final 
agency action under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and (2) NIGC 
Acting General Counsel’s legal opinion letter did not constitute a 
reviewable final agency action under Administrative Procedure Act. 
Affirmed.  
54. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico 
No. 16-2228, 863 F.3d 1226, 2017 WL 3028501 (10th Cir. Jul. 18, 
2017). Indian tribe brought action against state of New Mexico, 
Governor of New Mexico, and members of New Mexico Gaming 
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Control Board, alleging that New Mexico failed to negotiate new 
gaming compact in good faith under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) and that state officials conspired to deprive tribe of federal 
right to be free of state jurisdiction over activities that occurred on 
tribal lands. The District Court, 2015 WL 10818855, granted Indian 
tribe’s motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) and 
preliminary injunction barring defendants from taking regulatory 
enforcement actions against non-Indian, state-licensed gaming 
manufacturer vendors doing business with Indian tribe’s gaming 
enterprises. While defendants’ interlocutory appeal from order 
granting injunction was pending, the District Court, 214 F. 
Supp. 3d 1028, entered order staying preliminary injunction and 
dismissing action, and then denied motion by tribe to vacate district 
court’s order, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1289. Tribe appealed. The appellate 
court held that: (1) de novo review applied to issue on appeal of 
whether district court had jurisdiction to proceed to merits given 
interlocutory appeal of preliminary injunction and, even if it did, of 
whether it erred in concluding that IGRA did not preempt New 
Mexico’s regulatory enforcement actions; (2) district court could 
reach merits of action even though preliminary injunction was 
pending on appeal; (3) traditional preemption analysis that looked 
to whether federal law expressly or implicitly preempted state law 
applied to New Mexico’s regulatory enforcement actions; (4) IGRA 
did not expressly preempt New Mexico’s regulatory enforcement 
actions against non-Indian, state-licensed gaming manufacturer 
vendors doing business with Indian tribe’s gaming enterprises; and 
(5) IGRA did not implicitly preempt New Mexico’s off-reservation 
actions. Affirmed. 
55. Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Group, LLC v. Picayune 
Rancheria Of Chukchansi Indians, et al. 
No. 1:17-cv-00394-DAD-BAM, 2017 WL 3190325, (E.D. Cal. 
Jul. 27, 2017). This matter came before the court for hearing of 
defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 16, 
2017, plaintiff Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Group, LLC 
(OBIG), commenced this action against defendants Picayune 
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Chukansi Tribe) and Chukchansi 
Economic Development Authority (CEDA) alleging breach of 
contract and negligent interference with prospective economic 
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advantage. Plaintiff seeks an award of compensatory damages, 
restitutionary damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and 
costs. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. In October 
2014, the Casino closed. Defendants subsequently began working to 
reopen the facility. On July 8, 2015, defendants contracted with 
plaintiff for “business consulting advice and services” related to the 
reopening of its casino (the Consulting Contract). The Consulting 
Contract provided that the agreement would take effect upon 
execution and would be effective for a term of twenty-four months 
or until the “facility becomes managed pursuant to a Management 
Agreement approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission” 
(NIGC). The contract also provided that defendants “expressly, 
unequivocally and irrevocably waive their sovereign immunity” for 
“any legal proceeding with respect to the Consulting Agreement, or 
any of the transactions contemplated in the Consulting Agreement.”  
The Tribal Council for the Chukchansi Tribe approved the 
agreement by adopting Resolution No. 2015-31. On the same day 
the parties entered into the Consulting Contract, the parties also 
orally agreed to enter into a Management Agreement, and 
defendants promised to promptly submit the Management 
Agreement to the NIGC for approval. On July 29, 2015, defendants 
entered into the Management Agreement with plaintiff, which 
agreement the Chukchansi Tribal Council approved by adopting 
Resolution No. 2015-46. The contract stated that it had a term of 
five years and would take effect five days after the following 
conditions were met: (i) the Chairman of the NIGC granted written 
approval of the contract; (ii) the Chukchansi Tribe and NIGC 
concluded background investigations of plaintiff; and (iii) plaintiff 
received all applicable licenses and permits for the facility. From 
July to December 2015, plaintiff provided management and 
consulting services to defendants. The Casino reopened on 
December 31, 2015. In April 2016, the parties agreed to amend the 
Management Agreement to adjust plaintiff’s compensation rate and 
to extend the term of the agreement from five to seven years. 
Defendants also agreed to submit a revised version of the agreement 
to the NIGC for approval. To date, defendants have failed to submit 
either the original Management Agreement or the proposed 
amended agreement to the NIGC. As a result of defendants’ failure 
to submit either the agreement or the revised agreement to the NIGC 
for approval, plaintiff has experienced financial loss. On May 10, 
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2017, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 
complaint in its entirety based on this court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The court concludes that the addressing of plaintiff’s 
claims does not require resolution of a substantial question of federal 
law, and that the court therefore lacks original jurisdiction over any 
claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons stated above 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and this action is 
dismissed. 
H. Jurisdiction, Federal 
56. Alvarez v. Lopez 
No. 12-15788, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16056 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 
2016). Member of Indian tribe filed petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging that his convictions and sentences by tribal court 
violated Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Arizona, 2012 WL 1038746, denied petition, and 
petitioner appealed. After affirmance, 773 F.3d 1011, petition for 
panel rehearing was granted. The appellate court held that: (1) tribe 
deliberately waived any non-exhaustion defense, and (2) tribe 
violated petitioner’s right to jury trial under Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA). The court concluded that the inmate’s interests in 
understanding the full contours of his rights under 25 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1302, part of the Indian Civil Rights Act, outweighed any interests 
of the community. The inmate’s right to “fair treatment” included 
the right to know that he would forfeit his right to a jury unless he 
affirmatively requested one. Judgment reversed, and case remanded. 
57. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains 
Lending, LLC 
 
No. 14-55900, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1028 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017). 
The panel affirmed the district court’s decision compelling Tribal 
Lending Entities to comply with civil investigative demands issued 
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Tribal entities 
are for-profit lending companies created by the Chippewa Cree, 
Tunica Biloxi and Otoe Missouria Tribes (Tribes). The Bureau 
initiated an investigation into the Tribal Lending Entities to 
determine whether small-dollar lenders violated federal consumer 
financial laws. The Tribes directed the Tribal Lending Entities not 
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to respond to the investigative demands. The panel held that the 
Consumer Financial Protection Act was a law of general 
applicability, and it applied to tribal businesses, like the Tribal 
Lending Entities involved in this appeal. The panel further held that 
Congress did not expressly exclude Tribes from the Bureau’s 
enforcement authority. The panel also held that none of the three 
exceptions in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farms, 751 F.2d 
1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985), to the enforcement of generally 
applicable laws against Indian tribes applied to this case. The panel 
concluded that the district court properly held that the Bureau did 
not plainly lack jurisdiction to issue investigative demands to the 
tribal corporate entities under the Act. Order affirmed. 
58. Jones v. United States 
No. 15-8629, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1479 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2017). 
HOLDINGS:  (1) Where decedent was shot during a police pursuit 
that ended on a Native American reservation, the trial court erred by 
dismissing the estate’s claim for damages against the United States 
because the court improperly limited the scope of claims cognizable 
under the bad men provision of the Treaty with the Ute, 15 Stat. 619 
(1868); (2) The estate claimed that officers concocted a false story 
that decedent shot himself, and failed to take custody of decedent’s 
body and to secure it against desecration and spoliation of evidence; 
(3) The trial court erred in dismissing all the off-reservation actions 
as not cognizable; (4) Some of the alleged wrongs were a 
continuation of the conspiracy to cover-up the on-reservation 
killing; (5) The trial court erred in issue precluding claims, as the 
culpability of the federal officers for spoliation had never been 
decided. Vacated and remanded. 
59. Wyoming v. United States EPA 
Nos. 14-9512 and 14-9514, 849 F.3d 861, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3120 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). This case requires us to determine 
whether Congress diminished the boundaries of the Wind River 
Reservation in Wyoming in 1905. The Eastern Shoshone and 
Northern Arapaho Tribes jointly inhabit the Wind River 
Reservation. The State of Wyoming and the Wyoming Farm Bureau 
Federation challenge a decision by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) granting the Tribes’ application for joint authority to 
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administer certain non-regulatory programs under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) on the Reservation. As part of their application for 
administrative authority, the Tribes were required to show they 
possess jurisdiction over the relevant land. In their application, the 
Tribes described the boundaries of the Wind River Reservation and 
asserted that most of the land within the original 1868 boundaries 
fell within their jurisdiction. Wyoming and others submitted 
comments to the EPA arguing the Reservation had been diminished 
in 1905 by act of Congress, and that some land described in the 
application was no longer within tribal jurisdiction. After review, 
the EPA determined the Reservation had not been diminished in 
1905 and the Tribes retained jurisdiction over the land at issue. 
Because the EPA decided the Tribes otherwise satisfied Clean Air 
Act program requirements, it granted their application. Wyoming 
and the Farm Bureau appealed the EPA’s Reservation boundary 
determination. Regionally applicable final actions of the EPA are 
directly appealable to this court. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), we grant the petition for review, vacate the 
EPA’s boundary determination, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. We find by its 1905 legislation, 
Congress evinced a clear intent to diminish the Reservation.  
60. Tavares v. Whitehouse 
No. 14-15814, 2017 WL 971799, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 
2017). Petitioners, who were members of Indian tribe and excluded 
from tribal lands and facilities for allegedly libeling and slandering 
tribe, sought writ of habeas corpus under Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA). The District Court, 2014 WL 1155798, dismissed petition. 
Petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) any disputes 
about per capita payments from an Indian tribe to a tribal member 
must be brought in a tribal forum, not through federal habeas 
proceedings; (2) temporary exclusion from Indian tribal land is not 
tantamount to a “detention,” for purpose of detention requirement of 
habeas corpus provision of ICRA; and (3) exclusion of petitioners 
was not a “detention” within meaning of habeas provision of ICRA, 
as required for district court jurisdiction. Affirmed.  
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61. United States v. Jackson 
No. 15-1789, 2017 WL 1228564 , 853 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 
2017). After his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, 
defendant, an Indian, entered a conditional plea of guilty in the 
District Court, 2011 WL 7395040, to assault with a dangerous 
weapon and discharging a firearm during commission of crime of 
violence. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 697 F.3d 670, 
vacated and remanded. On remand, the District Court entered final 
judgment sentencing defendant to 136 months in prison. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence supported district 
court's determination that reservation on which alleged assault 
occurred was not diminished by 1905 Act. Affirmed. 
62. Rabang v. Kelly 
No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 WL 1496415 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 
2017). This case arises out of the disenrollment of hundreds of 
Nooksack tribal members, and the subsequent Department of the 
Interior (DOI) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) decisions, also at 
issue in a related case before this Court. Plaintiffs in this matter are 
“purportedly disenrolled” members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. 
Defendants Kelly, George, Smith, Solomon, Johnson, and Canete 
are members of the Nooksack Indian Tribal Council that Plaintiffs 
classify as the “holdover council” as of March 24, 2016. Defendants 
Dodge, King George, Romero, Edwards, and Armstrong are other 
actors within Nooksack tribal leadership and agencies. Plaintiffs 
allege “Defendants' scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and the federal 
government began with fraudulently preventing elections for over 
half of the eight” Nooksack Indian Tribal Council seats. The 
Nooksack Indian Tribal Council carries out tribal governance and 
consists of eight positions. Five members constitute a quorum for 
the Council. On October 17, 2016, Lawrence S. Roberts, DOI's 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, issued a 
decision to the holdover council Defendants stating: “In rare 
situations where tribal council does not maintain a quorum to take 
action pursuant to the Tribe's Constitution, the Department of the 
Interior does not recognize actions taken by the Tribe. This is one of 
those exceedingly rare situations. Accordingly, I am writing to 
inform you and the remaining Council members that the [DOI] will 
only recognize those actions taken by the [Nooksack Indian Tribal] 
  
 
118 
Council prior to March 24, 2016, when a quorum existed, and will 
not recognize any other actions taken since that time.”  However, 
also on October 17, 2016, the holdover council Defendants mailed 
Plaintiffs and over 275 other Tribal members a “Notice of 
Involuntary Disenrollment.”  On November 9, 2016, the holdover 
council Defendants mailed the disenrolled members a “Legal Notice 
of Disenrollment” and stated that a disenrollment “meeting date” 
had been set via teleconference for November 16, 17, or 18, 2016. 
On November 14, 2016, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Roberts issued a second decision to the holdover council Defendants 
reiterating “until a Council is seated through an election consistent 
with tribal law . . . , we will not recognize any “referendum election” 
including the purported results posted on the Tribe's Facebook page 
on November 4, 2016, claiming to disenroll current tribal citizens. . 
. .”  On February 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, 
alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants Kelly, George, Smith, 
Solomon, Johnson, Canete, King George, Romero, Edwards, and 
Armstrong filed this motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the foregoing reasons, 
Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED 
in part. The Court DISMISSES the § 1962(c) money laundering 
claim and all § 1962(c) claims against Defendant Armstrong. 
However, these claims are dismissed without prejudice because 
dismissal with prejudice is “improper unless it is clear, upon de novo 
review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”  
Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 
616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010).  
63. Denise Lightning Fire v. United States 
No. 3 15-CV-03015-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72316 (D.S.D. 
May 9, 2017). Plaintiffs Denise Lightning Fire and Wakiyan Peta 
are the legal guardians of SC, a minor child. The Plaintiffs sued the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U S C 
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, alleging that the negligence of a federal 
employee caused SC to be burned by hot oil while cooking frybread 
at the Cheyenne-Eagle Butte School. The United States filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3), or in 
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SC was a student attending the 
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Cheyenne-Eagle Butte School on the Cheyenne River Indian 
Reservation and participating in her home economics class, learning 
how to make stuffed frybread. As SC was putting her piece of 
frybread into the hot oil, water on the fork contacted the hot oil and 
caused the oil to spatter onto her hand, wrist, neck and face. After 
SC screamed in pain, her teacher, Peggy Henson, began running 
cold water over the burns and notified the school office. SC was 
taken to the Eagle Butte Indian Health Services facility for 
treatment. Plaintiffs presented an administrative claim for SC’s 
injuries, pain and suffering, and emotional distress to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) and to the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE). 
Plaintiffs’ administrative claim was denied. In September 2015, 
Plaintiffs filed this claim under the FTCA, requesting damages for 
SC’s physical pain, loss of enjoyment of life, mental and emotional 
suffering, past and future medical expenses, prejudgment interests, 
costs and attorney’s fees. The United States answered the 
Complaint, denying that SC’s teacher, Henson, was a federal 
employee. The United States then filed a motion to dismiss or 
alternatively a motion for summary judgment. The motion to 
dismiss argued that Henson was not a federal employee for purposes 
of the FTCA, so this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The motion for summary judgment 
argued in the alternative that if this Court found Henson to be a 
federal employee, her conduct was protected under the discretionary 
function exception to the FTCA. The court granted Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss.  
64. United States v. Antonio 
No. CR 16-1106 JB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85436 (D.N.M. June 5, 
2017). This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
filed April 10, 2017 (Motion). The primary issue is whether the 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the Indian Pueblo Land 
Act Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573 
(Dec. 20, 2005), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, because the 
automobile collision giving rise to Plaintiff United States of 
America’s criminal prosecution against Defendant Jeffrey Antonio, 
which occurred on private land, nonetheless occurred within the 
exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant to the Sandia 
Pueblo, which Congress confirmed in the Act of December 22, 
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1858, 11 Stat. 374, 374 (1859). The Court concludes: (i) the 
automobile collision giving rise to this criminal cause of action 
occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land 
grant; and, consequently, (ii) under 25 U.S.C. § 33m the Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the Court denies 
Antonio’s Motion.  
65. In re Roberts Litigation 
No. 15-35404, 693 Fed. Appx. 630, 2017 WL 2928130 (9th Cir. 
Jul. 10, 2017). Sherri Roberts, a non-Indian, was arrested twice 
pursuant to bench warrants issued by the Northern Cheyenne Tribal 
Court. She brought a Bivens action against three Bureau of Indian 
Affairs law enforcement officers (BIA Officers), alleging that both 
arrests violated her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. She also 
brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United 
States for the second arrest, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court 
granted summary judgment against Roberts on all claims. The 
district court correctly granted summary judgment against Roberts 
on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims on the ground that the 
BIA Officers had qualified immunity. Because the BIA Officers did 
not violate clearly established constitutional law when they arrested 
Roberts pursuant to a facially valid warrant issued by the tribal 
court, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The officers’ good 
faith reliance on the facially valid warrant was not unreasonable. 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment against 
Roberts on the FTCA claims alleging false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress because 
Roberts’s second arrest was made pursuant to facially valid warrant. 
The bench warrant was issued pursuant to the tribal judge’s correct 
determination that Roberts failed to appear at a status conference, 
which established probable cause to arrest her. Thus, the lawful 
arrest is a “complete defense” to Roberts’s false arrest or 
imprisonment claims. The BIA Officer did not engage in a 
“negligent act or omission.”  Affirmed.  
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66. United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai  
College, Inc. 
 
No. 15-35001, 2017 WL 2924090 (9th Cir. Jul. 10, 2017). Former 
employees filed qui tam action under False Claims Act (FCA) 
alleging that college located on Indian reservation, college 
foundation, and college’s board members knowingly provided false 
progress reports on students in order to keep grant monies coming 
from Department of Health and Human Services ad Indian Health 
Service. The United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, No. 9:12-cv-00181, dismissed complaint, and employees 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe was not 
“person” subject to suit under FCA, and (2) issue of whether college 
was arm of tribe was matter to be addressed in first instance by 
district court following jurisdictional discovery. Reversed and 
remanded.  
67. Dennis Ruchert v. John Pete Williamson; Nez Perce Tribal 
Police; and Nez Perce Tribe 
No. 3:16-cv-00413-BLW, 2017 WL 3120267 (D. Idaho Jul. 21, 
2017). Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Jurisdiction. This negligence action arises from a motor 
vehicle collision on March 27, 2014, involving Plaintiffs Dennis 
Ruchert and Cheryl Ruchert and Defendant John Pete Williamson, 
an employee of the Nez Perce Tribal Police Department. On March 
8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court, alleging that the collision 
was caused by Williamson’s negligence and seeking damages for 
personal injuries and property damage. Defendants had the action 
removed to this Court on September 14, 2016. Soon thereafter, the 
United States filed the present Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The United States Attorney for the District of 
Idaho, on behalf of the Attorney General, filed a certification 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) stating that Williamson was 
acting within the scope of his employment with the Nez Perce Tribal 
Police Department at the time of the accident. The certification also 
attests that Defendants Williamson, Nez Perce Tribal Police, and 
Nez Perce Tribe were performing authorized functions under the 
tribe’s funding contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs pursuant 
to the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(ISDEAA). Accordingly, the United States argues that it must be 
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substituted as the sole named defendant in this action and that 
Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy lies under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA). Because Plaintiffs failed to file an administrative tort claim 
with Williamson’s employing agency prior to filing suit, as required 
by the FTCA, the United States argues that this court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear their claims. The Court granted 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the matter was dismissed 
without prejudice. 
68. Murphy v. Royal 
 
Nos. 07-7068 & 15-7041, 866 F.3d 1164, 2017 WL 3389877 (10th 
Cir. Aug. 8, 2017), Opinion Amended and Superseded on Denial of 
Rehearing en banc by Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 
2017). After Oklahoma state prisoner’s conviction for first-degree 
murder and death sentence were affirmed on appeal, 47 P.3d 876, 
he filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1257, denied 
prisoner’s petition. Prisoner appealed. The appellate court held that:  
(1) prisoner’s claim was governed by clearly established federal 
law; (2) Oklahoma state appellate court rendered merits decision on 
prisoner’s claim that state court lacked jurisdiction because crime 
occurred on Indian land; (3) Oklahoma state appellate court’s 
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; and (4) 
Congress did not disestablish Indian reservation, and thus Oklahoma 
state court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for murder that 
occurred on reservation. Reversed and remanded. 
 
69. United States v. Bearcomesout 
No. 16-30276, 2017 WL 3530904 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017). Tawnya 
Bearcomesout appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion 
to dismiss the indictment and challenges her guilty-plea conviction 
for involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) 
and 1112(a). Bearcomesout argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
barred her successive homicide prosecutions by the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe and the United States government because the two 
entities are not separate sovereigns. This argument is foreclosed. See 
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870-72 (2016) 
(successive prosecutions for the same offense are not barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause if brought by separate sovereigns, and 
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Indian Tribes “count as separate sovereigns under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause”). Furthermore, Bearcomesout has not shown 
impermissible collusion between the United States government and 
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe such that an exception applies under 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See United States v. Lucas, 
841 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2016) (impermissible collusion occurs 
where “the prosecutors of one sovereign so thoroughly dominate or 
manipulate the prosecutorial machinery of the other sovereign that 
the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings” (internal 
quotations omitted)). AFFIRMED.  
I. Religious Freedom 
70. Begnoche v. D.L. Derose 
No. 16-3723, 676 Fed. Appx. 117, 2017 WL 378741 (3rd Cir. 
Jan. 12, 2017). State prisoner brought § 1983 action against various 
prison officials, alleging that officials prevented him from 
exercising his Native American religious beliefs, that prisoners of 
non-Christian faiths were provided disparate treatment, that prison 
staff tampered with his legal correspondence, and that prison 
grievance system was inadequate. The District Court of the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, 2016 WL 4611545, granted in part 
officials’ motion to dismiss, granted in part prisoner’s motion for 
reconsideration, and granted officials’ motions for summary 
judgment. Prisoner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) officials did not deprive prisoner of his First Amendment right 
to practice his religion, and (2) officials did not interfere with 
prisoner’s exercise of his Native American religious beliefs or 
violate the Establishment Clause. Affirmed. 
J. Sovereign Immunity 
71. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. 
No. 15-3127, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16515 (7th Cir. Sep. 8, 2016). 
When Congress enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction 
Act (FACTA) in 2003, it included within the Act a provision to 
reduce the amount of potentially misappropriatable information 
produced in credit and debit card receipts. The Act prohibits 
merchants from printing on the receipt the credit card expiration date 
and more than the last five digits of the credit or debit card number. 
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The plaintiff in this case, Jeremy Meyers, used his credit card to 
make purchases at two stores owned by the defendant, the Oneida 
Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, and received an electronically-
printed receipt at each store that included more than the last five 
digits of his credit card as well as the card’s expiration date. Meyers 
brought a putative class action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
for violations of FACTA, but the district court determined that the 
defendant, an Indian Tribe, was immune from suit under the Act. 
Meyers appealed and the appellate court affirmed, holding: 
(1) Since the Indian Tribe had sovereign immunity, plaintiff could 
not obtain relief from the Tribe through his suit; (2) Congress simply 
had not unequivocally abrogated the sovereign immunity of Indian 
Tribes under the FACTA provision at issue in the case; (3) Contrary 
to plaintiff’s assertion, the district court did not dismiss his claim 
because it concluded that Indian Tribes were not governments; (4) It 
dismissed his claim because it could not find a clear, unequivocal 
statement in FACTA that Congress meant to abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of Indian Tribes; (5) The question here was not whether 
the Tribe was subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), it 
was whether plaintiff could sue the Tribe for violating the FCRA. 
Dismissal affirmed. 
72. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown 
Holdings, LLC) 
Nos. 08-53104, 10-05712, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3605 (U.S. Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. Sep. 29, 2016). The Litigation Trustee (Plaintiff) by this 
adversary proceeding essentially seeks to avoid aspects of a 
restructuring and financing transaction whereby Greektown 
Holdings, LLC, a Debtor, directly or indirectly transferred money to 
multiple parties, including the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians and its political subdivision Kewadin Casinos Gaming 
Authority (together, the Tribe Defendants). Plaintiff brought this 
fraudulent transfer action under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 550, 
incorporating Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 566.34 and 566.35. This 
Opinion follows the District Court’s Opinion, In re Greektown 
Holdings, LLC, 532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2015) reversing this 
Court’s Opinion at 516 B.R. 462 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). This 
Court had concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) abrogated the Tribe 
Defendants’ sovereign immunity, but the District Court (a) reversed 
on appeal finding that the statute does not thereby waive tribal 
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sovereign immunity; and (b) remanded the case for further 
proceedings relative to whether or not the Tribe Defendants had 
waived sovereign immunity. This Opinion deals with what 
constitutes a “clear waiver by the tribe.”  The Tribe Defendants’ 
initial argument is that the indicated clear waiver may only be 
accomplished by the required passage of duly adopted resolutions 
by the boards governing each of the Tribe Defendants. It is 
undisputed that no such resolutions were ever adopted. Further, it is 
also an undisputed fact that the Tribe Defendants never entered into 
any contract containing provisions purporting to waive sovereign 
immunity. Plaintiff responds arguing that, notwithstanding the lack 
of enacted resolutions, the Tribe Defendants can and should be seen 
as having waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of their 
conduct in, or incident to, these bankruptcy and related proceedings, 
as well as the involved underlying business transactions. 
Specifically that alleged conduct involves the Tribe Defendants 
having pervasive involvement in the events leading up to and after 
the Debtors’ bankruptcy filings, including the Tribe Defendants 
doing the following: (a) intermingling the functions of the various 
tribal and non-tribal parties in carrying out the Debtors’ business; 
(b) utilizing the Debtors as their agents and causing the Debtors to 
make the alleged fraudulent transfers; (c) directing the Debtors to 
initiate their bankruptcy petitions; (d) dominating and controlling 
the Debtors, directing their post-petition litigation strategy, and 
sharing the same professionals; and (e) filing in the bankruptcy 
cases multiple proofs of claim, objections to plan confirmation, and 
an application for allowance of administrative expense claim. Based 
on these facts and events, Plaintiff argues that (1) the Tribe 
Defendants should be considered as legally standing in the shoes of 
the Debtors as their equivalents via theories of alter ego, piercing 
the corporate veil, and/or agency; and (2) by reason of such, the 
Tribe Defendants thusly should be seen as having voluntarily 
waived their sovereign immunity. The questions presented thus are: 
(a) is appropriate and specific governing board action the only way 
the Tribe Defendants can waive their sovereign immunity; and (b) if 
not, and if waiver can be accomplished by conduct, was there such 
a waiver in the circumstances of this case?  The court held that: 
(1) An Indian tribe did not waive tribal sovereign immunity in a 
bankruptcy trustee’s action alleging that the tribe was the recipient 
of fraudulent transfers from bankruptcy debtors, since the tribe’s 
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assertion of claims in the bankruptcy cases did not constitute the 
required express, unequivocal, unmistakable, and unambiguous 
waiver of immunity; and (2) Even if the trustee could prove that the 
tribe effectively filed the bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the 
debtors under theories of alter ego, piercing the corporate veil, 
and/or agency, such asserted waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by 
implication was legally insufficient to meet the high standard of an 
express waiver of immunity. Motion to dismiss granted.  
73. Crawford v. Couture 
No. DA 16-0282, 2016 Mont. LEXIS 976, 2016 MT 291 (Mont. 
Nov. 15, 2016). Robert Crawford appeals from an April 20, 2016, 
District Court order granting a motion to dismiss Crawford’s claims 
against Flathead Tribal Police Officer Casey Couture (Couture), the 
Flathead Tribal Police Department, and the Confederated Salish 
Kootenai Tribal Government. The issue on appeal was whether the 
District Court erred when it dismissed Crawford’s claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. On March 13, 2012, Crawford was 
pulled over by Couture on the Flathead Reservation. Couture 
identified each person in the vehicle, arrested one, letting Crawford 
and the others leave. Couture was then in contact with Crawford’s 
parole officer, who informed Couture that Crawford was in violation 
of his parole because he did not have permission to be traveling in 
that area. On March 17, 2012, Lake County Deputy Sheriff Levi 
Read (Read) arrested Crawford on the Flathead Reservation upon a 
warrant issued by Butte-Silver Bow County Probation for parole 
violations. The State charged Crawford with criminal possession of 
dangerous drugs. A jury found him guilty. Crawford appealed his 
conviction and we affirmed in State v. Robert Lee Crawford, 2016 
MT 96, 383 Mont. 229, 371 P.3d 381. During his appeal, Crawford 
filed the instant complaint in state court seeking recovery from the 
named defendants. Crawford alleged numerous claims including 
libel, slander, false imprisonment, and injuries involving property 
due to inappropriate conduct by Couture. The Tribes, on behalf of 
the Tribes, Couture, and the Police Department filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint or in the alternative for summary judgment. 
The District Court granted the Tribes’ motion to dismiss based on 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the sovereign immunity of the 
Tribe. Crawford appealed. The appellate court found that the (1) 
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district court properly dismissed Crawford’s claims based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. Affirmed.  
74. Clema v. Colombe 
No. 16-2004, 676 Fed. Appx. 801, 2017 WL 360486 (10th Cir. 
Jan. 25, 2017). Suspect brought § 1983 action against tribal police 
officer and county, alleging that his arrest was unlawful. The United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted 
summary judgment for defendants. Suspect appealed. The Court of 
Appeals held that: (1) officer was public employee entitled to 
immunity under New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA); 
(2) officer had probable cause to arrest suspect; and (3) an arrest 
supported by probable cause cannot be the basis for a claim of false 
imprisonment or malicious prosecution. Affirmed. 
75. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
No. 91622-5, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 219 (Wash. Feb. 16, 2017). 
Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe own 
adjacent properties in Skagit County, Washington. A barbed wire 
fence runs along the southern portion of the Tribe’s land. The fence 
spans the width of the Tribe’s lot, with a gate approximately halfway 
along the fence line. The land between the fence and the southern 
boundary of the Tribe’s lot is the land at issue in this case. The 
Lundgrens bought the 10 acres of land immediately south of the 
disputed property in 1981. The property had been in their extended 
family since 1947. The Lundgrens established that the fence on the 
disputed property has been in the same location since at least 1947, 
and that for as long as their property has been in the family, they 
have treated the fence as the boundary line. Since 1947, the 
Lundgren family exclusively has harvested timber, cleared brush, 
kept the fence clear of fallen trees, and treated the disputed property 
on the southern side of the fence as their own. In September 2014, 
the Tribe notified the Lundgrens in a letter that the fence did not 
represent the boundary and that they were asserting ownership rights 
to the entire property deeded to them in 2013. The Lundgrens asked 
the court to quiet title in the disputed property to them and sought 
injunctive relief. The Lundgrens moved for summary judgment, 
arguing they acquired title to the disputed property by adverse 
possession or by mutual recognition and acquiescence long before 
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the Tribe bought the land. The Tribe moved to dismiss under CR 
12(b)(1) for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity and under CR 12(b)(7), which requires joinder 
of a necessary and indispensable party under CR 19. HOLDINGS: 
(1) Action to quiet title to property on a theory of adverse possession 
was not barred by the court’s inability to assert personal jurisdiction 
over the Indian tribe due to sovereign immunity because the action 
was a proceeding in rem and, following a merit-based determination 
under Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19, it could not be said that the Indian 
tribe had an interest that would be adversely affected in the 
litigation; (2) When no interest is found to exist, especially in an in 
rem proceeding, nonjoinder presents no jurisdictional barriers; (3) 
Because the Indian tribe did not have an interest in the disputed 
property, the tribe’s sovereign immunity was no barrier to the in rem 
proceeding. The trial court’s denial of the Indian tribe’s motion to 
dismiss and its grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs were 
affirmed by the reviewing court. 
76. Pacheco v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. 
No. CV-16-01947-PHX-GMS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23352 (D. 
Ariz. Feb. 16, 2017). Pending before the Court is Defendant Salt 
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Robert Pacheco is a former police officer for Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community. The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian 
Community (the Community) is a sovereign Native American 
Indian Tribe. In 2014, Mr. Pacheco suffered from a chronic medical 
condition that required him to be absent from work for an extended 
period of time. He alleges that he initially filed for and received 
forms for approved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), and that the Community improperly revoked his leave and 
discharged him. Soon after the Complaint was filed, the Community 
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Both parties concede that the 
Community is a federally recognized Native American Indian Tribe, 
and it is therefore entitled to the presumption of tribal sovereign 
immunity. However, Plaintiff asserts that tribal sovereign immunity 
should not apply in this case because it was effectively waived by 
the Community’s alleged adoption of FMLA standards for its 
continuous leave policy. Even assuming that the Community has 
adopted the FMLA standards, this argument fails. Without any 
explicit reference to “court enforcement, suing or being sued, or any 
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other phrase clearly contemplating suits against” the tribe, the tribe’s 
adoption of FMLA policies do “not amount to an unequivocal 
waiver” of sovereign immunity. Therefore, the Community did not 
waive its tribal sovereign immunity by adopting FMLA policies and 
standards. IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that the Community’s 
Motion to Dismiss is granted.  
77. Bruguier v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians 
Nos. 16-cv-604-jdp, 16-cv-605-jdp, 2017 WL 684230 (W.D. Wis. 
Feb. 21. 2017). Plaintiffs Jeaninne Bruguier and Joni Theobald 
asserted claims under Title VII and state law, alleging that 
defendants wrongfully terminated their employment and otherwise 
violated their rights because of plaintiffs’ political activities. 
Defendants Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians, L.D.F. Business Development Corporation, and Henry St. 
Germaine jointly moved to dismiss these actions on several 
threshold issues. The court will dismiss all Title VII claims under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for plaintiffs’ failure to 
state a claim. Tribal sovereign immunity precludes their claims, and 
an Indian tribe is not an employer under Title VII. The court will 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 
claims and dismiss both cases. IT IS ORDERED that: 
(1) Defendants Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians, Henry St. Germaine, and L.D.F. Business Development 
Corporation’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; (2) These cases are 
DISMISSED. 
 
78. Harper v. White Earth Human Resource  
 
No. 16–1797 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL 701354 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 
2017). MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE 
JUDGE. Plaintiff Leigh Harper brings this action pro se against 
Defendants White Earth Human Resource, White Earth Boys and 
Girls Club, and White Earth Education Department (collectively 
Defendants). Harper alleges that she worked at the White Earth 
Boys and Girls Club and that she was fired “to prevent her 
grievances and complaints from being acted on.” Harper alleges 
various statutory and constitutional claims, including violations of 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Minn. Stat. 
§ 181.961, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Revised 
Constitution of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. On June 17, 2016, 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. An agency is entitled to sovereign immunity if it 
“served as an arm of the sovereign tribes, acting as more than a mere 
business.”  Hagen, 205 F.3d at 1043. Sovereign immunity covers 
the actions of tribal governments and tribal agencies unless it has 
been unequivocally waived or abrogated by Congress. The 
supporting documents that Harper submitted indicate that White 
Earth Tribe was her employer. Despite these concessions, Harper 
argues that because the alleged actions were not carried out by 
members of the White Earth government acting within the scope of 
their authority, the actions are not protected by sovereign immunity. 
However, contrary to Harper’s assertion, tribes or tribal officials 
need not explicitly invoke sovereign immunity; instead, courts 
assume that the tribe is immune unless Congress has expressly 
abrogated that protection, or the tribe has expressly waived its 
immunity. Thus, the tribal entities sued here are entitled to sovereign 
immunity, and Harper’s lawsuit is barred absent abrogation or 
waiver. Harper’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.  
 
79. In re Money Center of America, Inc. 
Case No. 14–10603 Jointly Administered, Adv. Proc. Case No. 14–
50437, Adv. Proc. Case No. 16–50410, 2017 WL 775780, 
565 B.R. 87 (D. Del. Feb. 28, 2017). Chapter 11 trustee brought 
adversary proceeding to recover allegedly preferential transfers 
made to tribal entity the operated casino for benefit of Indian tribe. 
In separate proceeding, another tribal entity brought adversary 
proceeding for determination that sums owed to it under its financial 
services agreement with debtor were not included in property of the 
estate, and trustee counterclaimed for recovery of prepetition 
preferential transfers. Tribal entities moved to dismiss trustee’s 
complaint or counterclaims based on their alleged tribal sovereign 
immunity. The Bankruptcy Court held that: (1) entities which 
operated casinos for benefit of Indian tribes had sufficiently close 
relationship to tribes to share in tribes’ sovereign immunity; 
(2) Congress did not unequivocally express its intent to abrogate 
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sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, such that Indian tribes, or 
closely-affiliated entities that operated casinos on tribes’ behalf, 
could not be object of preference avoidance proceedings absent a 
waiver of their tribal sovereign immunity; (3) waiver issue could not 
be determined on motion to dismiss; (4) bankruptcy statute that 
barred creditor that was recipient of avoidable transfer from 
recovering on its claim until transfer was repaid was not operative 
as to tribal entity; and (5) tribes and tribal entities were not 
“governmental units,” under statute providing that “governmental 
unit” that had filed a proof of claim was deemed to have waived its 
sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against that 
governmental unit which was property of the estate, and which arose 
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Motion granted in part 
and denied in part. 
80. Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria v. Kenwood 
Investments No. 2, LLC 
A147281, 2017 WL 895800 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7. 2017). Federated 
Indians of Graton Rancheria (the Tribe) entered into an agreement 
with Kenwood Investments No. 2, LLC (Kenwood), whereby 
Kenwood would provide consulting services concerning the 
development of a casino on a particular site. In connection with this 
agreement, the Tribe approved a resolution waiving its sovereign 
immunity from suit by Kenwood. The parties subsequently amended 
the agreement to allow for the development of another site. 
Litigation ensued when the Tribe allegedly failed to make required 
payments to Kenwood, and the Tribe claimed its waiver of 
sovereign immunity did not apply because of the amendment to the 
contract. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment for 
Kenwood and also awarded Kenwood attorney fees pursuant to an 
indemnity clause in the agreement. We affirm the trial court’s 
findings regarding sovereign immunity but reverse the award of 
attorney fees. 
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81. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Runyon 
No. 3:17–cv–00038-AA, 2017 WL 923915, 320 F.R.D. 245 (D. 
Ore. Mar. 8, 2017). Railroad brought action against members of 
county board of commissioners and Columbia River Gorge 
Commission seeking declaration that Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted permitting 
process imposed by county ordinance and that application of county 
ordinance to prohibit railroad’s project to build new track violated 
commerce clause. Environmental organizations intervened as 
defendants. Indian tribes moved to dismiss with prejudice for failure 
to join tribes as required party. The District Court held that: 
(1) tribes were necessary party; (2) tribes’ interest in their treaty-
reserved fishing rights related to subject matter of railroad’s action, 
as required to be necessary party; (3) tribes’ interest in their treaty-
reserved fishing rights would not be adequately represented by 
defendants, as required to be necessary party; (4) joinder of tribes 
was not feasible; (5) tribes were indispensable party, warranting 
dismissal with prejudice; and (6) public rights exception did not 
apply to preclude dismissal. Motion granted. 
82. Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe 
No. C16-0052JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654 (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 21, 2017). Before the court is Defendants Sauk-Suiattle Indian 
Tribe of Washington (the Sauk-Suiattle or the Tribe), Community 
Natural Medicine, PLLC (CNM), Christine Morlock, Robert 
Morlock, and Ronda Metcalf’s (collectively Defendants) motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff Raju Dahlstrom’s claims against them. On January 
12, 2016, Mr. Dahlstrom filed a complaint under seal pursuant to the 
qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729-33, and the Washington State Medical Fraud and False 
Claims Act (MFFCA), RCW 74.66.005 et seq. The Sauk-Suiattle is 
a federally recognized Native American tribe in Darrington, 
Washington. CNM is a health clinic in Arlington, Washington, 
owned by Dr. Morlock and Mr. Morlock. The complaint also lists 
Dr. Morlock, Mr. Morlock, and Ms. Metcalf (collectively, 
Individual Defendants), who is the Director of the Indian Health 
Service (IHS) and the Health Clinic of the Sauk-Suiattle, as 
defendants. The Sauk-Suiattle employed Mr. Dahlstrom from 2010 
through his termination on December 8, 2015. The Tribe initially 
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hired Mr. Dahlstrom as a Case Manager, but in April 2015, the Tribe 
promoted him to Director. Mr. Dahlstrom alleges that Defendants 
knowingly presented or caused to be presented false or fraudulent 
claims to the United States — and by extension, the State of 
Washington. The Sauk-Suiattle tribe is a federally recognized 
Native American tribe. The Tribe is thus immune from Mr. 
Dahlstrom’s qui tam FCA claims. Because the Sauk-Suiattle has 
sovereign immunity with respect to Mr. Dahlstrom’s qui tam suit, 
whether CNM is also immune depends on whether it “functions as 
an arm of the tribe.”  The court concludes that Defendants have not 
met their burden of establishing that CNM is an arm of the tribe. The 
court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss CNM on the 
basis of sovereign immunity. Mr. Dahlstrom is suing Individual 
Defendants in their individual capacities. Defendants argue that 
Individual Defendants “were tribal employees or agents or officials 
acting in their official tribal capacity.”  Defendants argue that the 
Tribe’s sovereign immunity, therefore, extends to Individual 
Defendants. The court concludes that Individual Defendants are not 
immune from suit due to sovereign immunity. Being fully advised, 
the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to 
Mr. Dahlstrom’s claims against the Sauk-Suiattle but DENIES the 
motion with respect to Mr. Dahlstrom’s claims against CNM, Dr. 
Morlock, Mr. Morlock, and Ms. Metcalf.  
83. Lesperance v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
No. 2:16-cv-232, 2017 WL 1505329 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2017). 
Plaintiff fell and hurt herself in a tribal store. She sued the Tribe in 
tribal court and lost because the tribal court found that Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the procedural requirements embedded in the 
Tribal ordinance waiving sovereign immunity for injuries in public 
buildings. Plaintiff then filed this federal action to overturn the 
decision of the tribal court system. The Court has sympathy for 
Plaintiff's position on the particulars of this record, but the Court has 
no jurisdiction to overturn the Tribe's application of its own 
sovereign immunity ordinance in its own tribal courts. Accordingly, 
this matter is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court takes no position on the merits of the Tribe's 
interpretation and application of its own ordinance.  
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84. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan 
No. 16-2050, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9204 (10th Cir. May 26, 
2017). HOLDINGS: (1) A public utility company was precluded 
from condemning Indian tribal land for an easement for an electrical 
transmission line since the statutory authority to condemn lands 
previously allotted to individual Indians did not extend to tribal 
lands which the United States held in trust for the tribe even if the 
tribe reacquired the lands long after allotment; (2) Tribal lands 
which were not subject to condemnation included lands in which the 
tribe held any fractional interest since, when all or part of a parcel 
of allotted land owned by one or more individual Indians was 
transferred to the United States in trust for the tribe, that land became 
tribal land not subject to condemnation. Order affirmed. 
85. Frank Ireson v. Avi Casino Enterprises, Inc. 
No. 2:17-CV-987 JCM (VCF), 2017 WL 2960526 (D. Nev. Jul 10, 
2017). Presently before the court is defendant AVI Casino 
Enterprises, Inc., doing business as AVI Resort & Casino’s (AVI) 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The instant action 
concerns a slip-and-fall incident in a Fort Mojave Tribe casino. On 
April 8, 2015, AVI’s property was undergoing renovations. As a 
result of those renovations, and AVI’s alleged negligence, Ireson 
tripped on a piece of metal about two to three inches long sticking 
out of the floor. As a result of fall, Ireson slammed against the 
concrete floor, allegedly sustaining “significant and substantial 
injuries upon his person requiring immediate medical care.”  Ireson 
required an ambulance to take him to the hospital. On June 29, 2015, 
Ireson’s counsel sent a letter advising AVI of Ireson’s claim, to 
which there was no reply. On December 16, 2016, a demand for 
settlement was sent to AVI, at which time Ireson received a response 
asserting he failed to comply with the Fort Mojave Indian Tribal 
Tort Claims Ordinance. The instant action for negligence was filed 
on April 6, 2017. In the instant motion, AVI asserts sovereign 
immunity and moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). AVI 
argues in its motion to dismiss that the casino “functions as an arm 
of the tribe and is protected by tribal sovereign immunity.”  Here, 
AVI is a tribal corporation. AVI is a tribal corporation formed under 
tribal law, is wholly-owned and operated by the Fort Mojave Tribe, 
is governed by the tribal council, operates on tribal land, and its 
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revenue is deposited into the tribal treasury. Ireson contends in his 
response to AVI’s motion to dismiss that AVI’s “sovereign 
immunity is not absolute under these facts” and that AVI has 
implicitly waived its sovereign immunity. To support his argument, 
Ireson relies on the “sue and be sued” clause in the tribal enabling 
ordinance. The court disagrees as “the cited ordinance was repealed 
and replaced.”  The existence of a tribal procedure for the provision 
of tort remedies is, itself, evidence that the tribe has not waived 
sovereign immunity. Moreover, Ireson provides no legal basis for 
the argument that failure to give notice of those tort remedies is 
grounds for waiver of sovereign immunity. In light of the foregoing, 
AVI’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Ireson’s complaint will be 
dismissed without prejudice.  
86. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Lewis Tein, P.L. 
No. 3D16–2826, 227 So. 3d 656, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 11442 (D. 
Fla. Aug. 9, 2017). HOLDINGS: (1) A suit by an Indian Tribe’s 
former lawyers against the Tribe alleging civil remedies for criminal 
practices, § 772.103(3), Fla. Stat., and four counts of malicious 
prosecution, was barred by the Tribe’s sovereign immunity; (2) 
Although the Tribe had waived its immunity in a prior lawsuit for 
the limited purpose of allowing questioning of a Tribe attorney 
about documents he had produced, and had waived its immunity in 
three prior suits against the attorneys, these waivers did not extend 
to the lawyers’ suit; (3) The immunity waivers in the prior four cases 
did not extend to subsequent litigation, even though the subsequent 
case was related and arose out of the same facts; where the prior 
litigation ended and the new case began was the point that the waiver 
was unclear and not explicit. Trial court’s order reversed, and case 
remanded for the trial court to grant the Tribe’s motion to dismiss. 
87. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington 
No. 3:16-cv-05566-RJB, 2017 WL 3424942 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 
2017). This matter was before the Court on cross motions for 
summary judgment filed by the defendants, State of Washington and 
Robert W. Ferguson (the State) and the plaintiff, Stillaguamish 
Tribe of Indians (the Tribe). The primary, and ultimately dispositive, 
issue before the Court is the enforceability of a sovereign immunity 
waiver in a contract, Salmon Project Agreement 04-1634, which 
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was signed by Mr. Pat Stevenson, an employee and non-member of 
the Tribe. Mr. Stevenson has been the Tribe’s Environmental 
Engineer for approximately thirty years. Mr. Stevenson is not an 
enrolled member of the Tribe and is therefore not eligible to be a 
Director. Salmon Project Agreement No. 04-1634 sets out 
contractual obligations of the Tribe and the Salmon Recovery 
Funding Board (SRFB), the entity responsible for administering the 
Salmon Funding Accounts for the State of Washington. In 
consideration for a state grant of $497,000, the Tribe, referred to in 
the agreement as the “Sponsor,” was to execute a project entitled, 
“Steelhead Haven Landslide Remediation.”  Two sections of 
Salmon Project Agreement No. 04-1634 are pertinent to this case. 
The indemnification clause, provides: To the fullest extent permitted 
by the law, the Sponsor expressly agrees to and shall indemnify, 
defend and hold harmless the State ... against all claims, actions, 
costs, damages, or expenses of any nature arising out of or incident 
to the Sponsor’s or any Contractor’s performance or failure to 
perform the Agreement. Section 41 provides:  Any judicial award, 
determination, order, decree or other relief, whether in law or equity 
or otherwise, resulting from the action shall be binding and 
enforceable. Any money judgment against the Tribe, tribal officers 
and members, or the State of Washington ... may not exceed the 
amount provided for in Section F—Projecting Funding of the 
Agreement. C. The Tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity as 
necessary to give effect to this section, and the State of Washington 
has waived its immunity to suit in state court. These waivers are only 
for the benefit of the Tribe and State and shall not be enforceable by 
any third party[.]  Mr. Stevenson managed the Steelhead Haven 
Landslide Remediation project, which took several years to 
complete, on behalf of the Tribe. In summary, by its own terms 
Salmon Project Agreement 04/1635 clearly waives the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity, but the agreement is not binding on the Tribe. 
The agreement was not entered into with the requisite authority, 
because neither the Tribe’s constitution, prior policies and practices, 
nor any resolution delegating the Board’s plenary waiver power 
show an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, on 
the issue of waiving sovereign immunity, summary judgment should 
be granted against the State and in favor of the Tribe. Because the 
Court finds that the Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity, the 
Court does not reach the State’s equitable arguments.  
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K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent 
88. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Colombe 
    (In re Estate of Colombe) 
 
No. 27587, 2016 S.D. LEXIS 102, 2016 S.D. 62 (S.D. Aug. 31, 
2016). An estate appealed from a circuit court’s decision to grant 
comity to a Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court order. The order pierced a 
business’s corporate veil and held decedent personally liable for a 
judgment in favor of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. Charles Colombe, 
a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe (RST) died on June 9, 2013. 
His son, Wesley Colombe, filed a petition for informal probate in 
Todd County, Sixth Judicial Circuit, and was appointed as personal 
representative of Charles’s estate (the Estate). In February 2014, 
Wesley provided written notice to creditors. The RST filed a notice 
of creditor’s claim, seeking to enforce an April 19, 2012, Rosebud 
Sioux Tribal Court (Tribal Court) order and judgment for 
$527,146.76. In response, Wesley filed a notice of disallowance of 
claim, asserting the RST could not show that the order was entitled 
to comity by satisfying the requirements of SDCL 1-1-25. The 
circuit court granted comity to the tribal court order and judgment. 
Wesley, on behalf of the Estate, appealed. The April 19, 2012, 
tribal court judgment was the culmination of more than a decade of 
steady litigation between RST and BBC Entertainment Inc. (BBC). 
Aspects of the case have been reviewed by the Tribal Court, the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe Supreme Court (RST Supreme Court), the 
federal district court, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
circuit court did not err by granting comity to Judge Meyers’s 
Tribal Court order pursuant to SDCL 1-1-25. Although not 
specifically authorized by Article XI, §§ 2 and 4 of the RST 
Constitution or RST Code § 9-1-5, Judge Meyers’s appointment 
was authorized under RST Code § 4-2-8 as a long-standing tribal 
practice. Moreover, the proceedings did not deprive Charles of due 
process. He had several opportunities to appeal the Tribal Court 
rulings to the RST Supreme Court and elected not to do so. The 
enforcement of the Tribal Court judgment does not violate public 
policy. Affirmed. 
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89. Soldier v. Dougherty 
No. CIV-16-958-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133506 (W.D. Okla. 
Aug. 31, 2016). Petitioners, appearing with counsel, filed a Petition 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The 
matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial 
proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the 
following reasons, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed 
without prejudice upon filing. Petitioners GoodEagle and Easley 
alleged that they were arrested at Iowa tribal headquarters on 
August 19, 2016, and Petitioner Big Soldier alleged he was arrested 
on the same date by a Lincoln County law enforcement officer at the 
Lincoln County Jail, “when he went to see about posting bond” for 
Petitioners GoodEagle and Easley. Petitioners state that they are 
being detained in the Lincoln County Jail, “for allegedly violating 
an Iowa tribal district court gag order by speaking to attorney Peggy 
Big Eagle” concerning an Indian Child Welfare Act case pending in 
that tribal court. Petitioners allege[d] that their arrest and detention 
violate “tribal, state and federal Constitution and the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.”  Petitioners request “an immediate hearing for 
petitioners to obtain their liberty,” service of process by the United 
States Marshals Service, and a “reasonable attorney fee of $10,000 
at $200/hour against defendants and each of them.”  Respondents 
named in the Petition include Dougherty, in his capacity as the 
Sheriff of Lincoln County, Oklahoma. A federal court reviewing 
such an action must first determine whether the petitioner has 
exhausted tribal remedies. See Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses 
for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Thus, exhaustion of tribal remedies is generally required prior to 
review in federal court of a habeas action challenging tribal court 
proceedings. Petitioners assert[ed] that they have attempted to file, 
through a representative, a “Motion to Set Aside the Permanent Gag 
Order,” but that Respondent Rowe refused to file the Motion 
because Petitioner’s representative was not a member of the tribal 
bar although her application is pending. Petitioners assert[ed] that 
they are being held in the Lincoln County Jail without any 
documentation of the basis for their detention or means to obtain 
their freedom, but Petitioners also acknowledge that “[t]ribal courts 
commonly require cash bonds” and that they are aware they are 
being detained for allegedly violating a tribal court order. Under 
these circumstances, it does not appear that exhaustion of tribal 
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remedies would be futile. Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to exhaust tribal remedies.  
90. State v. Priest 
Nos. 32221-1-III, 33704-9-III, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 2568 
(Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2016). David Randall Priest sought, through a 
personal restraint petition, relief from his convictions for possession 
of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of stolen property in the 
third degree. Priest contended that the superior court lacked 
jurisdiction over him and the prosecution because he is an enrolled 
member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Nation and any 
crimes occurred solely on tribal land. Because the only evidence of 
possession of stolen property showed the property to be on 
reservation land, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the prosecution against David Priest. The appellate court 
vacated his convictions, judgment, and sentence.  
91. Corp. of Latter Day Saints v. LK 
No. 2:16-cv-00453-RJS-BCW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159025 (D. 
Utah Nov. 16, 2016). This case relates to lawsuits presently pending 
before the Navajo Nation District Court. In those cases, Defendants 
RJ, MM, BN, and LK (Doe Defendants) allege that they suffered 
abuse years ago after Plaintiffs, the Corporation of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and LDS Family 
Services, placed them off-reservation with LDS families as part of 
the Indian Student Placement Program (ISPP). In their Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs here seek a declaration that the Navajo Nation 
District Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying cases, 
and request an injunction prohibiting Doe Defendants from 
proceeding with their cases in Tribal Court. Plaintiffs argue that the 
Tribal Court clearly lacks jurisdiction over Doe Defendants’ claims, 
and that this court should so find now, without requiring Plaintiffs 
to exhaust their Tribal Court remedies by presenting their 
jurisdictional arguments to the Tribal Court in the first instance. 
Two motions are before the court: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doe 
Defendants filed three separate actions in the Navajo Nation District 
Court, District of Window Rock, Arizona. In the cases before the 
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Tribal Court, Doe Defendants allege injuries resulting from their 
placement with LDS families while participating in the ISPP 
between 1965 and 1983. The ISPP “continued for over forty years, 
ending in approximately 1990, with tens of thousands of Navajo 
Nation children having participated.”  As part of the program, Doe 
Defendants and their families agreed that Doe Defendants, who 
were children at the time, would be placed during the school year in 
homes of LDS Church members outside of the reservation to attend 
public school. Doe Defendants allegedly suffered sexual abuse 
while living with these families. Doe Defendants do not claim that 
any of the sexual abuse at issue occurred on the reservation or on 
property owned by the Navajo Tribe. At this stage of the case, the 
court is required to accept the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true. The 
court therefore accepts for purposes of deciding Doe Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss that none of the alleged abuse occurred on the 
reservation, and that none of the placement decisions were made on 
the reservation. Doe Defendants assert eight causes of action in their 
Tribal Court cases: (1) childhood sexual abuse, (2) assault and 
battery, (3) negligence, (4) negligent supervision/failure to warn, 
(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) equitable relief, 
(7) common law nuisance and request for injunctive relief, and 
(8) violations of Navajo Common Law. Plaintiffs responded to Doe 
Defendants’ Tribal Court complaints by filing this federal court 
action. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Navajo Nation District 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe Defendants’ lawsuits. 
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction asking this 
court to enjoin Doe Defendants from proceeding with their cases in 
Tribal Court. The court found that Plaintiffs failed at this stage in 
the proceeding to meet their substantial burden of showing that 
Tribal Court jurisdiction is clearly foreclosed. While it appears that 
jurisdiction over certain claims — including those for direct liability 
for the sexual assaults — may be foreclosed, it is not clear that Tribal 
Court jurisdiction is clearly lacking for all of Doe Defendants’ 
claims. Because Plaintiffs request an injunction that would prevent 
Doe Defendants from proceeding in Tribal Court on any of their 
claims, it was Plaintiffs’ burden to show that all routes to jurisdiction 
were clearly foreclosed. The court GRANTS Doe Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs must first exhaust their remedies in the 
Tribal Court before seeking redress in this court. The case is 
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dismissed without prejudice. The court DENIES as moot Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  
92. Jimenez v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.  
Council Mbrs 
 
No. CV-16-00089-PHX-DJH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172943 (D. 
Ariz. Dec. 13, 2016). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Raymond Jimenez, 
a member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community 
(SRPMIC), alleges in the Amended Complaint that on December 
19, 2014, he received an order from the SRPMIC council members 
that prohibits him from occupying certain Community buildings and 
adjoining grounds without obtaining prior express permission. 
Plaintiff alleges that this order is illegal and in violation of his due 
process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the 
SRPMIC Constitution. Plaintiff claims he was not charged with a 
crime or arrested for the alleged “confrontational incidents” that 
apparently formed the basis for the letter and order issued to 
Plaintiff. In addition to the factual allegations, Plaintiff argues in the 
Amended Complaint that the Defendants are not protected by 
sovereign immunity. He further contends that the Ex Parte Young 
doctrine authorizes a suit against officers of a sovereign government 
where the plaintiff alleges continuing unlawful conduct and seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief only. For relief, Plaintiff requests 
that the Court “restore [his] rights to be free” and his right to 
employment, which Plaintiff claims has been blocked as a result of 
the allegedly illegal order. Plaintiff further claims he “is not here for 
money” but to enforce his due process rights. Also referenced in the 
Amended Complaint is a decision by the SRPMIC Court after 
Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion raising the same claims he now 
asserts here. In its Order dated January 30,2015, the SRPMIC Court 
made factual findings regarding the content of the December 2014 
letter/order issued to Plaintiff by the SRPMIC Council. The Order 
also included conclusions of law regarding the jurisdiction of the 
SRPMIC Court, in which the Court explained that its jurisdiction is 
limited to certain types of disputes and does not encompass reviews 
of Tribal Council actions or claims alleging violations of the 
SRPMIC Constitution. The Court therefore concluded it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of Plaintiff s claims. 
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The Court also pointed out that Plaintiff did not challenge the order 
with the Tribal Council itself, even though the letter that 
accompanied the order invited Plaintiff to provide written reasons if 
he believed the order should be rescinded. Defendants argue that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs claims. In addition, 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under the ICRA fails as a 
matter of law because Plaintiff is not seeking habeas corpus relief, 
which is the only remedy the ICRA allows. The Court found that 
Plaintiff does not allege that SRPMIC waived its sovereign 
immunity, or that Congress authorized a suit against the tribe or its 
council members under the circumstances presented here. Plaintiff 
therefore failed to establish any basis to override SRPMIC’s 
sovereign immunity. Consequently, this action must be dismissed. 
Accordingly, IT IS HERE BY ORDERD that Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss Amended Complaint is GRANTED.  
93. Mullally v. Gordon 
No. 13-55152, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22506 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 
2016). HOLDINGS: (1) The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe’s tribal court 
entered judgment on the former manager’s defamation and 
conversion claims; (2) The district court did not err by recognizing 
the tribal court’s judgment under principles of comity; (3) The tribal 
court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
manager’s defamation and conversion claims; (4) The manager was 
afforded due process by the tribal court; (5) His claims were 
reviewed by two separate tribal bodies; (6) The district court did not 
err by dismissing his intentional misrepresentation and promissory 
fraud claims or by granting summary judgment as to his intentional 
interference with contractual relations claim. Judgment affirmed.  
94. People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enterprises 
No. S216878, 2016 WL 7407327 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2016). The People 
brought action against five payday lenders for injunctive relief, 
restitution, and civil penalties for violations of the of the Deferred 
Deposit Transaction Law (DDTL). Two lenders controlled by 
Indian tribes specially appeared and moved to quash service of 
summons. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, denied motion. 
The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that: (1) entity asserting 
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tribal immunity bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it is an “arm of the tribe”; (2) when determining 
whether an entity is an “arm of the tribe” entitled to tribal immunity, 
courts should apply a five-factor test that considers (1) the entity’s 
method of creation, (2) whether the tribe intended the entity to share 
in its immunity, (3) the entity’s purpose, (4) the tribe’s control over 
the entity, and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and 
the entity; abrogating Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 71 Cal. 
App. 4th 632, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, Redding Rancheria v. Superior 
Court, 88 Cal. App. 4th 384, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, and American 
Property Management Corp. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 
491, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802; and (3) lenders did not have immunity 
under the “arm of the tribe” doctrine. Reversed and remanded. 
95. Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute 
Indians 
No. 16-cv-02438-WHO, 2017 WL 616465 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 
2017). Plaintiff Duanna Knighton, the former Tribal Administrator 
for defendant Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians (the 
Tribe), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Tribe, 
Cedarville Rancheria Tribal Court (Tribal Court), and Tribal Court 
Judge Patricia R. Lenzi (Tribal Judge Lenzi) (collectively 
defendants) to avoid Tribal Court jurisdiction over claims that she 
defrauded the Tribe and breached her fiduciary duties to it. 
Defendants move to dismiss Knighton’s complaint because the 
Tribal Court has jurisdiction. I agree that it has both regulatory and 
adjudicative authority over its former employee under the facts 
alleged; accordingly, it has subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ 
motion is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 
96. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria 
No. 16-cv-05391-WHO, 2017 WL 733114 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 
2017). Plaintiff James Acres seeks declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Blue Lake Rancheria Tribe (Tribe), the Blue Lake 
Rancheria Tribal Court (Tribal Court) and its Chief Judge, Lester 
Marston, alleging that the Tribal Court has conducted itself in bad 
faith in asserting jurisdiction over him in an underlying contractual 
fraud case because Judge Marston refused to recuse himself from 
the case and misrepresented his relationship with the Tribe. Judge 
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Marston has now recused himself from the Tribal Court case and 
appointed the Hon. James Lambden, a retired California Court of 
Appeal Justice with no prior connection to the Tribe, to preside over 
the matter. Given Judge Marston’s recusal and the appointment of a 
neutral judge, there is insufficient evidence of bad faith for the 
exception to apply. Acres does not meet any of the exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement. He must exhaust his tribal remedies before 
bringing an action of this kind in federal court. The Tribe’s motion 
to dismiss is GRANTED.  
97. French v. Starr 
No. 15-15470, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9690 (9th Cir. Jun. 1, 2017). 
Plaintiff Roger French appeals the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants, who are members of the Tribal 
Court and Tribal Council of the Colorado River Indian Tribes 
(CRIT). French argues CRIT lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
eviction proceedings relating to his leasehold (the Permit) on the 
California side of the Colorado River (the Western Boundary lands) 
because French’s lot is not part of the Colorado River Indian 
Reservation. Both the Permit and the assignment of that Permit to 
French described the lot in question as within the Colorado River 
Indian Reservation. French paid rent pursuant to the Permit, first to 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the benefit of CRIT and then 
directly to CRIT, from 1983 through 1993. French is therefore 
estopped from contesting CRIT’s title. See Richardson v. Van 
Dolah, 429 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1970), Goode v. Gaines, 145 
U.S. 141, 152, 12 S. Ct. 839, 36 L. Ed. 654 (1892) (estoppel does 
not depend on validity of landlord’s title), Williams v. Morris, 95 
U.S. 444, 455, 24 L. Ed. 360 (1877) (when tenant gains possession, 
tenant is estopped from denying title of landlord). Once French’s 
challenge to CRIT’s title is resolved, this case is squarely controlled 
by Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. La Rance, 642 
F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011) (CRIT properly exercised jurisdiction over 
an unlawful detainer action for breach of lease by a non-tribal 
member within the Western Boundary lands). AFFIRMED.  
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98. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation 
No. 15-4170, 862 F.3d 1236, 2017 WL 2952256 (10th Cir. Jul. 11, 
2017). Nonmember police officers brought action against Indian 
tribe, its business committee, tribal court, acting chief judge of tribal 
court, and parents of person killed by officers, seeking to halt 
allegedly unlawful exercise of tribal court jurisdiction over 
underlying action that was brought against them by tribe, decedent’s 
estate, and parents alleging wrongful death, trespass, and other torts. 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, No. 2:15-
CV-00300, denied defendants’ motions to dismiss, and granted 
officers’ motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) tribe’s trespass claim fell within 
jurisdiction of tribal court under Montana v. United States exception 
to principle that tribe generally lacked authority to regulate 
nonmember conduct; (2) tribe’s trespass claim fairly could be called 
catastrophic for tribal self-government, as required to fall within 
jurisdiction of tribal court under Montana v. United States 
exception; (3) tribal exhaustion was not required for claims against 
nonmember police officers alleging false imprisonment, false arrest, 
assault and battery, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and 
conspiracy; (4) state interest was not implicated by nonmember state 
police officers pursuing Indian tribe member on tribal land for on-
reservation offense, and thus tribal jurisdiction was not barred over 
trespass claim against officers; (5) bad faith exception from 
exhaustion of available tribal court remedies was not available as to 
trespass claim against nonmember police officers; (6) Ex parte 
Young exception to sovereign immunity applied to tribal official, 
sued in his official capacity, in suit seeking to halt allegedly 
unlawful exercise of tribal court jurisdiction; and (7) tribe, its 
business committee, and tribal court were not subject to Ex parte 
Young exception, and thus were entitled to tribal sovereign 
immunity. Vacated and remanded.  
99. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo County 
No. 15-16604, 863 F.3d 1144, 2017 WL 3044643 (9th Cir. Jul. 19, 
2017). Indian Tribe brought action against county, sheriff, and 
county district attorney, following arrest of Tribal police officer, 
seeking declaration that Tribe had right to investigate violations of 
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tribal, state, and federal law, and to detain and transport or deliver a 
non-Indian violator encountered on the reservation to the proper 
authorities, and seeking injunction prohibiting defendants from 
arresting, criminally charging, interfering with, or threatening tribal 
police department officers who exercised their lawful duties. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
No. 1:15-00367, 2015 WL 4203986, dismissed. Tribe appealed. The 
Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court’s order dismissing 
Tribe’s action for lack of jurisdiction was final appealable order; 
(2) Tribe adequately pleaded federal question; (3) Indian Law 
Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA) did not displace federal common 
law upon which Tribe’s complaint relied; (4) Tribe had standing to 
bring action; (5) action was ripe; and (6) action was not mooted by 
Tribe’s letter responding to county sheriff’s cease and desist letter. 
Reversed and remanded. 
L. Tax 
100. City of Snoqualmie v. King County Exec. Dow Constantine 
No. 91534-2, 2016 Wash. LEXIS 1376 (Wash. Dec. 22, 2016). The 
City of Snoqualmie challenged the validity of state legislation 
authorizing Indian tribes to make payments to the State in lieu of the 
State’s taxing their property. The city claimed that payments made 
in lieu of taxation are themselves taxes that violate constitutional 
provisions requiring uniformity of taxation, prohibiting the State 
from surrendering its power to tax, and specifying the circumstances 
when the legislature may delegate its taxing authority. The Superior 
Court on March 4, 2015, granted partial summary judgment in favor 
of the City, ruling that the City had standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the legislation and that payment in lieu of 
taxation under the legislation was a property tax that violated 
constitutional requirements and prohibitions. The Supreme Court, 
held that (1) The tribe’s payment in lieu of tax (PILT) was not a tax 
at all, but rather, a charge that tribes paid to compensate 
municipalities for public services provided to the exempt property; 
(2) Because the PILT was not a tax, it was not subject to Wash. 
Const. art. VII’s tax requirements and thus, the trial court’s 
judgment was improper; (3) The city had standing to challenge the 
PILT, both on its own behalf and in the form of representative 
standing on behalf of its residents; (4) The PILT’s purpose was to 
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allow the tribe to alleviate a burden to which it contributed; (5) The 
PILT was meant to offset the burden created by the tax exemption, 
in order to compensate the municipality for the services the tribal 
exempt land required. Judgment reversed. 
101. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington 
No. 2:15-cv-00940, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 5, 2017). Before the Court was Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Government Services Provided Outside the 
Boundaries of Quil Ceda Village, and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion 
for Order Regarding Government Services. As alleged in the 
Complaint, Plaintiff Tulalip Tribes is a federally-recognized Indian 
tribal government, and the Consolidated Borough of Quil Ceda 
Village (Village) is a political subdivision of the Tulalip Tribes. 
Together, Tulalip and the Village are suing the State of Washington 
and Snohomish County, along with state and county officials, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge 
three taxes imposed by the State of Washington and Snohomish 
County on non-Indian businesses and their patrons within the 
boundaries of Quil Ceda Village: retail sales and use taxes, Wash. 
Rev. Code §§ 82.08, 82.12, 82.14; business and occupation taxes, 
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04; and personal property taxes, Wash. Rev. 
Code § 84. Plaintiffs’ in their complaint sets forth three grounds for 
the illegality of the taxes. First, they allege the taxes violate the 
Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Second, 
they allege the taxes are preempted by federal law. And third, they 
allege the taxes interfere with Tulalip’s tribal sovereignty. The 
United States intervened as an additional plaintiff and alleged the 
same three counts. In their motion for summary judgment, 
Defendants argue that the Indian Commerce Clause does not bar the 
taxes at issue; Congress has not preempted the taxes at issue, which 
can be determined without a fact-intensive inquiry; and the taxes do 
not violate Tulalip’s tribal sovereignty. Plaintiffs, including the 
United States, move for an order that government services provided 
outside the Village and not directly supporting commerce in the 
Village have no legal effect for this action. The Court GRANT[ED] 
in part and DENIE[D] in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Motion was GRANTED as to Count I and denied as 
to Counts II and III. The Court DENIE[D] Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-
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Intervenor’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding 
Government Services. 
102. Desert Water Agency v. United States Department of the 
Interior 
No. 14-55461, 2017 WL 894462, 849 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 
2017). Political subdivision of the State of California brought action 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against the United 
States Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), challenging a federal regulation that the subdivision believed 
might preempt certain taxes and fees the subdivision assessed 
against non-Indians who leased lands within an Indian reservation. 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, No. 5:13-cv-00606, dismissed action for lack of 
standing. Subdivision appealed. The Court of Appeals, held that 
federal regulation did not preempt taxes and fees that political 
subdivision assessed against non-Indians who leased lands within 
an Indian reservation, and thus subdivision lacked standing to 
challenge the regulation. Affirmed. 
103. Cougar Den, Inc., a Yakama Nation corporation, 
Respondent, v. Washington State Department Of  
Licensing, Appellant 
 
No. 92289-6, 392 P.3d 1014, 2017 WL 1192119 (Wash. Mar. 16, 
2017). The issue in this case centers on the interpretation of the 
“right to travel” provision in Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty 
of 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 952-53 (1855), in the context of importing 
fuel into Washington State. The Washington State Department of 
Licensing (Department) challenges Cougar Den Inc.’s importation 
of fuel without holding an importer’s license and without paying 
state fuel taxes under former chapter 82.36 RCW, repealed by 
LAWS OF 2013, ch. 225, § 501, and former chapter 82.38 RCW 
(2007). Cougar Den is a Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakama Nation (Yakama Nation) corporation that transports fuel 
from Oregon to the Yakama Indian Reservation, where it is sold. 
Kip Ramsey, Cougar Den’s owner and president, is an enrolled 
member of the Yakama Nation. Cougar Den began transporting fuel 
in 2013 from Oregon to the Yakama Indian Reservation. Cougar 
Den contracted with KAG West, a trucking company, to transport 
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the fuel into Washington from March 2013 to October 2013. On 
December 9, 2013, the Department issued assessment number 756M 
against Cougar Den, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, 
penalties, and licensing fees for hauling the fuel across state lines. 
Cougar Den appealed the assessment to the Department’s ALJ, who 
held in his initial order that the assessment was an impermissible 
restriction under the treaty. Upon review, the director of the 
Department reversed the ALJ and entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Cougar Den then petitioned for review of the 
final order by the Department. The Yakima County Superior Court, 
sitting in an appellate capacity, reversed the director’s order and 
held that the taxation violated the tribe’s right to travel. The 
Department appealed the superior court’s decision and sought direct 
review under RAP 4.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court granted direct 
review and affirmed. 
104. New York v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
 
No. 15–1136, 2017 WL 1135257, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 24, 2017), Opinion Corrected and Superseded, 
2017 WL 2305380 (May 25, 2017). This lawsuit concerns a non-
tribal member, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), which allegedly 
transported, inter alia, cigarettes from and between New York State 
Indian reservations for a number of shippers (Relevant Shippers). 
Plaintiffs, the State of New York and the City of New York 
(collectively, plaintiffs, and, respectively, the State and/or the City), 
assert that in transporting unstamped (and therefore untaxed) 
cigarettes, UPS has violated an Assurance of Discontinuance (AOD) 
it signed with the State in 2005, as well as New York Executive Law 
(NY. Exec. Law) § 63(12); New York Public Health Law (PHL) 
§ 1399-ll; the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (“PACT Act”), 
15 U.S.C. §§375-78; the Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act 
(CCTA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-46; and the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.3. UPS 
has disputed that it ever violated its obligations under the AOD or 
knowingly transported unstamped cigarettes from or between Indian 
reservations to unauthorized recipients. The Court found that UPS 
violated its obligations under the AOD in a number of respects and, 
in addition, knowingly transported cigarettes from and between 
Indian reservations for all but one of the shippers (the Liability 
Shippers). For this reason and others, UPS’s arguments against any 
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liability fail. The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to 
compensatory damages as well as monetary penalties in amounts yet 
to be determined, but not injunctive relief or the appointment of a 
monitor.  
 
105. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 
No. 11, 2017 WL 1278708, 148 T.C. Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 
148.11 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 5, 2017). This is a worker classification 
case about hundreds of workers whom their employer – an Indian 
tribe – called independent contractors but whom the Commissioner 
called employees. The Mescalero Apache Tribe has moved to 
compel discovery of the IRS's records of those workers. During the 
2009-11 tax years the Tribe either employed or contracted with 
several hundred workers. During each of these years the Tribe 
timely issued Forms W-2 to its employees, and Forms 1099 to its 
contractors. This case began when the Commissioner audited the 
Tribe on suspicion that some of the workers classified as contractors 
were really employees. Reclassification would make the Tribe liable 
for taxes for its workers whom it improperly labeled as contractors. 
But it sees a way out: Section 3402 lets an employer in this situation 
escape tax liability if it can show the workers whom it labeled 
independent contractors paid income tax on their earnings. One way 
to do this would be for the Tribe to ask each worker to complete 
Form 4669, Statement of Payments Received. The Tribe tried to do 
that, but it was only partly successful because many of the Tribe's 
former workers have moved, and some live in hard-to-reach areas 
where they lack cell-phone service and even basic utilities. The 
Tribe wants the IRS to search the records of those 70 workers to 
determine whether they reported their Form 1099 income and paid 
their tax liabilities and then to adjust the Tribe's liability 
accordingly. The Tribe's current motion to compel discovery—this 
time in compliance with our rules—asks that we decide an issue that 
it turns out we have not yet analyzed in any opinion:  Can an 
employer take discovery of its workers' IRS records to reduce its 
own tax liability under section 3402?  The Commissioner objects, 
claiming that this is barred under section 6103 and that it amounts 
to a prohibited shift of the burden of proof from the Tribe to the 
Commissioner. We hold that the Tribe's workers' return information 
is disclosable under section 6103(h)(4)(C). Because the Tribe seeks 
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information that is both disclosable and discoverable, we hold for 
the Tribe.  
106. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New 
York 
No. 11-CV-6004 CJS, 2017 WL 1653026 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2017). 
This action challenges Seneca County’s ability to impose and collect 
ad valorem property taxes on parcels of real estate owned by the 
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York. The Cayuga Nation contends 
both that Seneca County cannot impose the property taxes, because 
the subject properties are “located within an Indian reservation,” and 
cannot sue to collect the taxes, because the Cayuga Indian Nation 
enjoys sovereign immunity from suit. Now before the Court is the 
Cayuga Nation’s motion to dismiss Seneca County’s counterclaim, 
which seeks a declaratory judgment that the subject properties, 
which the Cayugas ostensibly sold two centuries ago and then 
recently re-purchased, “are not now an Indian reservation for 
purposes of New York Real Property Tax Law § 454 or Indian Law 
§ 6 or [‘]Indian Country[‘] for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”  In 
recent years, the Cayuga Nation purchased at least five parcels of 
land in Seneca County, within the same geographic area as the 
Cayuga Indian Reservation that was established in 1789. Seneca 
County imposed property taxes on the Cayuga-owned properties, 
but the Cayuga Nation refused to pay the taxes. Thereafter, Seneca 
County initiated tax foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga 
Nation. In response to those foreclosure lawsuits, the Cayuga Nation 
commenced this lawsuit. The Cayugas’ pleading seeks two types of 
relief. First, the Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that the 
County cannot foreclose on, or otherwise “acquire, convey, sell or 
transfer title” to, “Nation-owned properties” within Seneca County. 
Second, the Amended Complaint seeks an injunction, prohibiting 
the County from making “any further efforts” to foreclose on, 
acquire, convey or otherwise sell “Nation-owned properties in 
Seneca County;” prohibiting the County from “interfering in any 
way with the Nation’s ownership, possession, and occupancy of 
such lands.”  Plaintiff’s application to dismiss Defendant’s 
counterclaim is granted, with prejudice.  
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107. Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions 
16–cv–01652 (CRC), 2017 WL 2274940 (D.D.C. May 24, 2017). 
Tribal-owned corporations engaged in distribution of cigarettes 
brought action against the Attorney General of the United States, 
seeking declaration clarifying whether certain recordkeeping 
requirements of the Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act (CCTA) 
applied to Indian tribal entities. Defendant moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court held that: (1) CCTA’s recordkeeping 
requirements applied to Indian tribal entities, and (2) tribal 
governments, and thus tribal-owned entities, were “persons” within 
meaning of CCTA and fell within scope of the Act. Motion granted.  
108. Perkins v. United States 
No. ORDER 16-CV-495, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123543 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017). This case presents what appears to be an 
issue of first impression: whether a treaty between the United States 
and Native Americans ensuring the free use and enjoyment of tribal 
land bars taxes on income derived directly from the land—here, the 
sale of gravel mined on the land. Although at least two circuit courts 
have suggested in dicta that “income derived directly from the land” 
might be exempt from taxation under such treaties, they did so to 
distinguish that scenario from cases where an exemption was sought 
for income earned in ways that do not relate to the land itself. See 
Lazore v. Comm’r, 11 F.3d 1180 (3d Cir. 1993); Hoptowit v. 
Comm’r, 709 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1983). And for the reasons that 
follow, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have plausibly stated a 
claim for relief under two treaties with the Native American Seneca 
Nation. On June 16, 2016, Fredrick and Alice Perkins commenced 
this action against the United States. The plaintiffs, one of whom is 
“an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation,” removed gravel, with 
permission, from the Seneca Nation Allegany Territory and later 
sold it. After receiving a “notice of deficiency” from the Internal 
Revenue Service, the plaintiffs paid taxes on the income from the 
sale. In the amended complaint, they alleged that they are owed a 
tax refund, interest, and penalties —totaling $9,863.68—because 
their income from the sale of gravel is not taxable under the Treaty 
with the Six Nations at Canandaigua of November 11, 1794 
(Canandaigua Treaty), and the Treaty with the Seneca of May 20, 
1842 (1842 Treaty). The United States has moved to dismiss the 
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amended complaint. On September 16, 2016, this Court referred this 
action to Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott. The Court adopted the 
recommendation of Judge Scott regarding the claims under the 
Canandaigua Treaty but rejected the recommendation regarding the 
claims under the 1842 Treaty. Accordingly, the government’s 
Motion to Dismiss [was] denied. 
M. Trust Breach and Claims 
109. Marcia W. Davilla, et al. v. Enable Midstream  
Partners, L.P., et al. 
 
No. CIV-15-1262, 2017 WL 1169710 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2017). 
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Liability for Their Trespass Claim and for a Permanent 
Injunction. Defendants are the owner and operator of a network of 
natural gas transmission pipelines across Oklahoma. Defendants’ 
transmission pipeline crosses an approximate 137-acre tract of land 
in Caddo County, Oklahoma, which had originally been an Indian 
allotment to Millie Oheltoint (Emaugobah), held in trust by the 
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA). Thirty-eight (38) Indians and the Kiowa Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma (Kiowa Tribe) own undivided interests in the tract, 
varying from 28.6% down to less than .9%. The original right of 
way expired on November 20, 2000. On or about June 14, 2002, 
defendants’ predecessor-in-interest, Enogex, Inc. (Enogex), 
submitted a right-of-way offer to the BIA and made an offer to 
plaintiffs for a new twenty-year easement, which was rejected by a 
majority of the landowners. Despite the rejection by a majority of 
the landowners, on June 23, 2008, the Interim Superintendent of the 
BIA’s Anadarko Agency approved Enogex’s application for the 
renewal of the right-of-way easement for twenty years. Plaintiffs 
appealed the Interim Superintendent’s decision, and on March 23, 
2010, the BIA vacated the interim superintendent’s decision. The 
BIA determined that it did not have authority to approve the right-
of-way without the consent of plaintiffs or their predecessors in 
interest and that the price offered by defendants was unreasonable. 
The BIA remanded the case for further negotiation and instructed 
that if approval of a right-of-way was not timely secured that Enogex 
should be directed to move the pipeline. A new right-of-way has not 
been granted, and defendants have continued to operate the natural 
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gas pipeline. The Court finds defendants’ continuing trespass on 
plaintiffs’ property is clearly not unintentional. Additionally, 
plaintiffs have objected to the renewal of the easement and 
defendants continued use of the pipeline from the time defendants 
first sought the renewal of the easement. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that in light of their continuing trespass, defendants should be 
permanently enjoined from using the pipeline under the tract at issue 
and should be required to move the pipeline within six (6) months 
of the date of this Order.  
110. Fletcher v. United States 
No. 16-5050, 2017 WL 1419010, 854 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 
2017). Tribal members brought class action against federal 
government, seeking an accounting to determine whether the federal 
government had fulfilled the fiduciary obligations it chose to assume 
as trustee to oversee the collection of royalty income from oil and 
gas reserves and its distribution to tribal members. The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, 2012 WL 
1109090, dismissed the tribal members' claims, and they appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, 730 F.3d 1206, reversed and remanded. On 
remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1354, D.C. No. 4:02-CV-00427, ordered 
government to provide an accounting. Tribal members appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court did not abuse its 
discretion in setting time period of accounting, and (2) district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it fashioned scope of accounting. 
Affirmed.  
111. Napoles, et al. v. Rogers, et al. 
No. 16-cv-01933, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. Jul, 10, 2017). On 
December 27, 2016, petitioners in this action filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1303. On January 28, 2017, they filed an amended petition which 
is now the operative pleading in this case. On May 5, 2017, 
respondents Poncho, Rogers, Romero, Vega, and Williams 
(collectively, the Tribal Council respondents) and respondent 
Kockenmeister, a tribal court judge, separately moved to dismiss the 
amended petition. At the core of this case is an intra-tribal dispute 
regarding the ownership of certain parcels of land on the Bishop 
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Paiute Reservation located in eastern California. The amended 
petition alleges petitioners were unlawfully detained by respondents 
when they were denied access to their family land and were cited for 
trespass when attempting to enter the disputed land. Respondents 
represent that the citations issued to petitioners are purely civil in 
nature, and that petitioners can only be fined and not incarcerated 
pursuant to those citations. On May 5, 2017, the same day 
petitioners moved to stay these proceedings, respondents moved to 
dismiss the petition for habeas relief now pending before this court. 
Because the court concludes that petitioners have not been subjected 
to “detention” within the meaning of § 1303, it lacks jurisdiction 
over this habeas action. Respondents’ motions to dismiss the 
pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus are granted, and the writ 
of habeas corpus is dismissed.  
N. Miscellaneous 
112. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty. 
No. 2:16-cv-00154-JNP-BCW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143454 (D. 
Utah Oct. 14, 2016). Before the court is a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction filed by Plaintiff Navajo Human Rights Commission and 
others against Defendants San Juan County, John David Nelson, 
Phil Lyman, Bruce Adams, and Rebecca Benally. Plaintiffs alleged 
that San Juan County’s voting procedures violate the Voting Rights 
Act. Plaintiffs brought the Preliminary Injunction Motion, 
requesting that the court require the County to implement new 
voting procedures before the November 2016 general election. San 
Juan County is a sparsely populated and geographically vast 
political subdivision of the State of Utah, occupying the state’s 
southeastern corner. The County’s southern boundaries encompass 
a large section of the federally established Navajo Reservation. As 
a result, approximately half of the County’s residents are members 
of the Navajo Nation. Most of the County’s Navajo residents live 
within the boundaries of the Reservation. This motion for 
preliminary injunction comes before the court in the context of a 
lawsuit initiated by the Navajo Human Rights Commission and 
several named plaintiffs who allege that the voting procedures in 
place in San Juan County violate the Voting Rights Act. The voting 
procedures at issue here span several years of elections. Prior to 
2014, the County conducted elections through nine polling places 
  
 
156 
open on Election Day. Each polling place provided some form of 
language assistance to Navajo-speaking voters. In 2014, the County 
transitioned to a predominantly mail-in voting system, leaving a 
single physical polling location operating at the County Clerk’s 
office in Monticello, Utah. Ballots were distributed to voters 
through available mailing addresses approximately one month prior 
to Election Day. This system was in place for the 2014 election 
cycle. During 2014 and early in 2015, the Navajo Nation and the 
Navajo Human Rights Commission officially opposed the mail-in 
system, asserting that the closure of polling locations and switch to 
mailed ballots burdened rural Navajo voters. The Commission filed 
the Complaint underlying this Motion on February 25, 2016, 
alleging that the mail-in ballot system violated the Voting Rights 
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their Answer, 
which asserted that the County was making significant changes to 
its election procedures in anticipation of the June 2016 primary 
elections. For the June 2016 elections, the County maintained the 
predominantly mail-in voting system, but also opened three physical 
polling locations on the Navajo Reservation and provided language 
assistance to voters through Navajo-speaking translators on Election 
Day. On August 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, asserting that whether the County employed the 2014 
mail-in voting system or the June 2016 procedures, the elections to 
be held in November 2016 would violate Sections 2 and 203 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Motion. The court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motion for 
preliminary injunction should be denied. It is so ordered.  
113. Navajo Nation, et al. v. San Juan County, a Utah 
governmental subdivision 
No. 2:12-00039, 2017 WL 3016782 (D. Utah Jul. 14, 2017). 
Plaintiffs, Navajo Nation and several individual tribe members 
(Navajo Nation), sued Defendant San Juan County, claiming the 
County Commission and School Board election districts violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Fifteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1973. The court previously found both sets of districts 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The court did 
not decide whether the School Board or County Commission 
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districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court then 
outlined a process for adopting legally sound remedial districts. The 
court suggested it would adopt San Juan County’s proposed 
remedial plans if they cured the identified violations and were 
otherwise legally sound. San Juan County’s remedial plans fail to 
pass constitutional muster. Specifically, the court concludes race 
was the predominant factor in the development of District 3 of the 
School Board plan and Districts 1 and 2 of the County Commission 
plan. The County’s consideration of race requires strict scrutiny 
analysis of these districts. The court concludes the County has failed 
to satisfy strict scrutiny and, therefore, these districts are 
unconstitutional. Taking account of “what is necessary, what is fair, 
and what is workable” given the circumstances of this case, the court 
concludes the new districts must be a product of an independent, 
neutral process, with ample opportunity for participation and 
feedback from the parties. For these reasons, the court declines to 
evaluate the proposed remedial plans submitted by Navajo Nation. 
It will instead appoint a special master to assist the court in 
formulating lawful remedial districts. SO ORDERED.  
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